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SIGNIFICANT ENTANGLEMENTS: A FRAMEWORK FOR THE
CIVIL CONSEQUENCES OF CRIMINAL CONVICTIONS

Colleen F. Shanahan*
A significant and growing portion of the United States population is or has
recently been in prison. Nearly all of these individuals will face significant
obstacles as they struggle to reintegrate into society. A key source of these
obstacles is the complex, sometimes unknown, and often harmful collection of civil
consequences that flow from a criminal conviction. As the number and severity of
these consequences have grown, courts, policymakers, and scholars have struggled
with how to identify and understand them, how to communicate them to defendants
and the public, and how to treat them in the criminal and civil processes. The
phenomenon of civil consequences of conviction presents an overlap of civil and
criminal law that poses difficult questions about how the theory behind this
overlap translates to practical application.
Padilla v. Kentucky, heralded by some as a watershed and treated by others as
an anomaly, is a first step in matching the law to the practical reality of the civil
consequences of criminal convictions. This Article examines Padilla and the
context in which it was decided and suggests that, although the dissenters in
Padilla may be correct that the opinion will be difficult to apply in a coherent way,
the decision has taken the first step towards a new legal doctrine of civil
consequences. The Supreme Court’s recent decision in Turner v. Rogers underscores that the Court’s approach in these two cases creates an opportunity to
consider this overlap of civil and criminal law and to create a more realistic,
consistent, and just doctrine of civil consequences of criminal convictions.
This Article begins the process of defining this doctrine by suggesting that
instead of inquiring into whether consequences are direct or collateral as courts
have in the past, courts should inquire into whether these civil consequences are
“significant entanglements” of civil and criminal law. First, courts should analyze
whether the civil consequence is significant, in both an objective and subjective
sense. Second, courts should examine whether the consequence is entangled with
the criminal process. Where significant entanglements exist, corresponding protections should follow. The Article goes on to suggest that the significant entanglement framework can be used to analyze whether Sixth Amendment protections
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should apply to a particular civil consequence at a particular stage of the criminal
process. Further, the significant entanglement framework can be applied outside
the Sixth Amendment context to understand the other constitutional protections
that may be applied by courts as a result of civil consequences of criminal
convictions. Thus, the significant entanglement framework is the next step in
developing a new doctrine for the protections that apply to civil consequences of
criminal convictions and for understanding this particular intersection of civil and
criminal law.
I. INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
II. CIVIL CONSEQUENCES OF CONVICTION, PADILLA, AND TURNER . . . . . .
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I. INTRODUCTION
The United States is facing the results of decades of being “tough on crime”:
millions of people who are leaving jail—many on probation and parole—are
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attempting to reenter society.1 This influx of individuals is a reentry crisis that
potentially threatens our social and economic stability and consigns millions of
Americans to a lifetime of poverty.2 A key part of this reentry crisis is the civil
consequences that state and federal legislatures have imposed on those convicted
of a crime.3 Remarkably, many of these consequences are unknown to defendants,
defense attorneys, prosecutors, and judges during plea and sentencing proceedings.4 The reality of this system is that individuals who have been convicted,
served a sentence, and are attempting to reintegrate into society become aware of
these consequences only when they are directly confronted by them—sometimes
well after that person’s interaction with the criminal justice system has ended and
outside of any court proceeding.5 Yet, courts for years found no obligation—for a
court or for counsel—to advise defendants of the consequences they face after
serving a sentence.6 Rather, courts relied on the theoretical division of civil and
criminal law to create a distinction that labels these consequences “collateral” and
isolates them from procedural protections afforded the “direct” consequences of
conviction such as a jail sentence.7 It was into this reality that the Supreme Court’s
decision in Padilla v. Kentucky stepped.8
For the first time, the Court in Padilla considered the practical functioning of the
civil consequences of criminal convictions and rejected the distinction between
direct and collateral consequences as a meaningful framework for analyzing the

1. See LAUREN GLAZE & THOMAS BONCZAR, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PROBATION AND PAROLE IN THE UNITED
STATES 2008, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS BULLETIN (2009) (noting that 5.1 million people were on probation or
parole at the end of 2008); WILLIAM J. SABOL ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PRISONERS IN 2008, BUREAU OF
JUSTICE STATISTICS BULLETIN (2009) (noting that 2.4 million people were in state and federal prison and jail at the
end of 2008).
2. See, e.g., Janet Reno, Remarks on Reentry Court Initiative at the John Jay College of Criminal Justice, New
York (Feb. 10, 2000), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/archive/ag/speeches/2000/doc2.htm.
3. This Article uses the nomenclature “civil consequences of criminal conviction” rather than “collateral
consequences” for consistency between its language and its argument that the direct-collateral distinction is no
longer useful. There is, however, an important caveat to this language choice, which is that these consequences of
conviction are not entirely “civil,” given their penal nature. See Jenny Roberts, Ignorance Is Effectively Bliss:
Collateral Consequences, Silence, and Misinformation in the Guilty-Plea Process, 95 IOWA L. REV. 119, 124 n.15
(2009). Similarly, one alternate set of vocabulary is “sanctions” for automatic consequences and “disqualifications” for discretionary consequences. See Court Security Improvement Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-177, 121
Stat. 2534 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 and 28 U.S.C.).
4. See Alec C. Ewald & Marnie Smith, Collateral Consequences of Criminal Convictions in American Courts:
The View from the State Bench, 29 JUST. SYS. J. 145, 153 (2008) (reporting results of survey of judges where half
report prosecutors rarely or never discuss consequences, one fifth say defense attorneys rarely or never do so, and
half say defendants rarely or never do so).
5. For example, an individual who has served a prison sentence, returned to society, and chosen to pursue a
new profession as a beautician may learn for the first time that she is barred from this profession. See Nora
Demleitner, Preventing Internal Exile: The Need for Restrictions on Collateral Sentencing, 11 STAN. L. & POL’Y
REV. 153, 156 (1999) (describing the evolution of this and similar consequences).
6. See infra notes 73–81 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 73–81 and accompanying text (discussing the direct-collateral distinction).
8. Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473 (2010).

Fn1

Fn2

Fn3

Fn4

Fn5

Fn6

Fn7
Fn8
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rights of defendants.9 In Padilla, the defendant, a legally resident alien, pled guilty
to a drug charge that made him automatically deportable.10 Before Mr. Padilla pled
guilty, his attorney incorrectly advised him that he did not have to worry about
being deported.11 As a result, Mr. Padilla raised a Sixth Amendment claim for
ineffective assistance of counsel.12 The cases that preceded Padilla—including the
Kentucky decision Mr. Padilla appealed—had found that immigration consequences were collateral and thus unprotected by the Sixth Amendment.13 In its
reversal, the Supreme Court found that the immigration consequences to which
Mr. Padilla was exposed were due Sixth Amendment protections.14 The Court then
applied the two-prong test for ineffective assistance of counsel,15 found that Mr.
Padilla had shown deficient performance by his attorney, and remanded for a
consideration of whether prejudice had also been shown.16
In reaching its conclusion in the context of deportation resulting from a guilty
plea, the Court rejected the direct-collateral distinction as a meaningful way of
deciding whether Sixth Amendment protections apply to a particular civil consequence of conviction, and instead, chose to evaluate the consequence on its own
terms.17 Through this fact-specific analysis, the Court found that Sixth Amendment protections apply to the consequence of deportation.18 In particular, the Court
focused on the severity of deportation and examined the nature of the consequence
and the criminal process to determine that a right to effective counsel existed.19
The Court’s recognition of the lack of clarity and usefulness of the direct-collateral
distinction, and its willingness to analyze the characteristics of a specific consequence rather than simply labeling it direct or collateral, civil or criminal, presents
an opportunity.20 This opportunity is to develop a coherent framework for
analyzing the civil consequences of criminal convictions that reflects how these
9. Id.
10. Id. at 1477; see infra notes 84–119 and accompanying text (discussing Padilla in depth).
11. Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1478.
12. Id.
13. Commonwealth v. Padilla, 253 S.W.3d 482, 485 (Ky. 2008).
14. Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1481.
15. See id. at 1482 (“[W]e first determine whether counsel’s representation ‘fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness.’ Then we ask whether ‘there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional
errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.’” (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,
688 (1984))).
16. Id. at 1481–82.
17. See id. at 1481.
18. See id. at 1483.
19. See id.
20. See id. at 1476 (“However, this Court has never distinguished between direct and collateral consequences
in defining the scope of constitutionally “reasonable professional assistance” required under Strickland . . . . The
question whether that distinction is appropriate need not be considered in this case because of the unique nature of
deportation. Although removal proceedings are civil, deportation is intimately related to the criminal process,
which makes it uniquely difficult to classify as either a direct or a collateral consequence. Because that distinction
is thus ill-suited to evaluating a Strickland claim concerning the specific risk of deportation, advice regarding
deportation is not categorically removed from the ambit of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel.”).

Fn9
Fn10

Fn11
Fn12
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consequences actually operate for millions of Americans. In short, it is an
opportunity to provide access to justice that is currently blocked for many.
Padilla is not the only entry point for developing a new framework of civil
consequences of conviction. Indeed, the broadest expression of the issue confronted in Padilla is the distinction between civil and criminal law.21 Although the
theoretical distinction between civil and criminal law, the broad practical implications of that distinction, the evolution of that distinction across our legal system,
and how the distinction serves (or does not serve) society are well beyond the reach
of this Article, the civil consequences of conviction are one application through
which to examine the fluidity between civil and criminal law.
Padilla poses this issue in the context of the right to counsel where deportation
is a possible consequence of conviction, but courts are grappling with the right to
counsel in multiple contexts. In the criminal process, the Sixth Amendment places
the right to counsel at issue, and the protection has heightened importance because
the adverse party is always the government.22 Padilla directly applies to those
situations where the starting point is a criminal prosecution, and the result is the
imposition of a consequence that exists in civil law, specifically, of a consequence
not created by criminal statute or regulation but by civil statute or regulation. But
the right to counsel is also at issue in the civil process, where case law continues to
evolve regarding how due process rights apply.23 This related evolution that uses
civil law as its entry point reveals the blurred distinction between civil and
criminal law, and suggests that Padilla’s approach of intensive factual analysis in
the criminal context also translates to protections in civil proceedings. The most
recent development in this evolution is the decision in Turner v. Rogers.24
The Supreme Court’s recent decision in Turner v. Rogers underscores the
staying power of Padilla’s analysis. Turner considered the right to counsel in a
civil contempt proceeding and concluded that a defendant in such a civil proceeding is entitled to a base level of due process protections—including the right to
counsel or other procedural safeguards—when threatened with incarceration.25
The Turner decision, considering a purely civil proceeding with a penalty that

21. See, e.g., KATHERINE BECKETT & STEVE HERBERT, BANISHED (2009) (exploring “broken window” policing
efforts that occur at the intersection of civil and criminal law); Wendy Gerwick Couture, White Collar Crime’s
Gray Area: The Anomaly of Criminalizing Conduct Not Civilly Actionable, 72 ALB. L. REV. 1 (2009); Laura J.
Kerrigan et al., Project: The Decriminalization of Administrative Law Penalties, Civil Remedies, Alternatives,
Policy, and Constitutional Implications, 45 ADMIN. L. REV. 367 (1993); Adam S. Zimmerman & David M. Jaros,
The Criminal Class Action, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 1385 (2011) (discussing an overlap of criminal and civil class
actions, and proposing reforms in light of their respective goals).
22. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (holding that the Sixth Amendment grants an indigent
defendant the right to state-appointed counsel in a criminal case).
23. See, e.g., Turner v. Rogers, 131 S. Ct. 2507 (2011) (determining the Due Process Clause does not require
provision of counsel in child support proceedings where the custodian to whom support is owed is not represented
by counsel).
24. Id.
25. Turner, 131 S. Ct. 2507.

Fn21

Fn22

Fn23

Fn24

Fn25
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resembled a criminal one, echoes Padilla in that it recognizes the reality that the
line between civil and criminal law is blurred.26 The Turner Court also adopted the
approach that an analysis of the procedural protections must include a consideration of the specifics of the particular proceeding and penalty.27 Thus, the Court
again focused on the significance of the consequence and the nature of the
proceedings that the defendant confronted to conclude that procedural safeguards
were required. Together, the Padilla and Turner decisions demonstrate that the
Supreme Court has opened the door for a coherent doctrine of access to justice for
individuals facing the civil consequences of criminal convictions.
This Article first examines the opportunity presented by the Padilla and Turner
decisions. The Article goes on to propose a framework for courts considering
whether Sixth Amendment rights should apply to the civil consequences of a
criminal conviction. Rather than categorizing a civil consequence as either
“direct” or “collateral” and then applying rights according to these strict categories, courts should begin by following the model of Padilla and Turner by
examining each civil consequence based on the facts of the particular case. This
examination should then analyze two key characteristics of a particular civil
consequence: first, whether the consequence is “significant”; and second, whether
the civil consequence is “entangled” with the criminal process. When both
characteristics are present, then the consequence is a “significant entanglement,”
namely, a civil consequence of sufficient importance and sufficiently intertwined
with the criminal process as to warrant protection. If the consequence is a
significant entanglement, then Sixth Amendment protections should apply.
The Article then applies the significant entanglement framework to several civil
consequences of conviction, demonstrating how the framework operates in these
instances to provide protection to some consequences but not others. In addition,
the Article explores how this framework might apply in other contexts, such as
analysis of the Sixth Amendment and due process protections that apply at critical
stages other than the plea stage. The Article concludes that the significant
entanglements framework provides a useful tool for considering the protections
that should be afforded the civil consequences of criminal convictions, for
considering broader procedural safeguards, and for understanding the fluidity
between civil and criminal law.

26. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
27. See Turner, 131 S. Ct. at 2510 (“Because a contempt proceeding to compel support payments is civil, the
question whether the ‘specific dictates of due process’ require appointed counsel is determined by examining the
‘distinct factors’ this Court has used to decide what specific safeguards are needed to make a civil proceeding
fundamentally fair. As relevant here those factors include (1) the nature of ‘the private interest that will be
affected,’ (2) the comparative ‘risk’ of an ‘erroneous deprivation’ of that interest with and without ‘additional or
substitute procedural safeguards,’ and (3) the nature and magnitude of any countervailing interest in not providing
‘additional or substitute procedural requirement[s].’) (citations omitted).

Fn26

Fn27
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II. CIVIL CONSEQUENCES OF CONVICTION, PADILLA, AND TURNER
In 2010, the Supreme Court decided Padilla v. Kentucky, spurring commentary
alternately describing the decision as a major turning point and as inconsequential
to defendants’ rights.28 Then, in 2011, the Supreme Court decided Turner v.
Rogers,29 which implicitly underscored the staying power of Padilla’s focus on the
significance of penalties and the interaction of civil and criminal law. Setting aside
predictions and characterizations about its potential impact on immigration, legal
services, or professional responsibility, the Padilla decision serves as a starting
point for analyzing the peculiar interaction of civil and criminal law that is the civil
consequences of a criminal conviction. Rather than resting on assumptions out of
sync with reality—such as that civil consequences of criminal convictions are
wholly separate from the criminal process—the Padilla Court looked at how the
civil consequence of deportation actually affects a criminal defendant.30 Rather
than simply deeming the deportation “collateral” to the criminal conviction and
setting it aside, the Court engaged in a fact-specific and robust analysis of the
applicability of the Sixth Amendment.31 This analysis led to all of the Justices
concluding that the defendant deserved some type of notice of the consequences he
faced.32 By basing its analysis on the practical application of these consequences,33 the Court opened the door to a legal framework for considering the civil
consequences of criminal convictions that accounts for the peculiar reality of this
intersection of civil and criminal law. In the subsequent Turner decision, considering the right to counsel in a civil contempt hearing, the Court also engaged in a
fact-specific inquiry into the reality of the intersection of civil and criminal law
when an indigent defendant faces a criminal penalty resulting from a civil
proceeding.34 Thus, Turner underscores the Court’s willingness to set aside a
classification-based approach to the right to counsel and instead engage in the facts
of each particular case to determine whether protections are warranted. To

28. See, e.g., Darryl K. Brown, Why Padilla Doesn’t Matter (Much), 58 UCLA L. REV. 1393 (2011) (arguing
that Padilla will not result in improvement in outcomes because substantive criminal law, sentencing law, and
non-criminal law of collateral consequences will not be affected, and this broader context actually provides
limited context for players to bargain to different outcomes); Rachel E. Rosenbloom, Will Padilla Reach Across
the Border?, 34 NEW ENG. L. REV. 327, 328 (2011) (“Padilla undoubtedly represents a major turning point in the
Court’s understanding of the relationship between criminal law and immigration law.”) .
29. Turner, 131 S. Ct. 2507.
30. See Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1484 (2010) (“When attorneys know that their clients face
possible exile from this country and separation from their families, they should not be encouraged to say nothing
at all. . . . [I]t would deny a class of clients least able to represent themselves the most rudimentary advice on
deportation even when it is readily available. It is quintessentially the duty of counsel to provide her client with
available advice about an issue like deportation and the failure to do so ‘clearly satisfies the first prong of the
Strickland analysis.’” (citing Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 62 (1985) (White, J., concurring)).
31. See id. at 1477–87.
32. See id. at 1477–97.
33. See id.
34. See Turner, 131 S. Ct. at 2512–20.

Fn28
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understand how the Padilla and Turner decisions present an opportunity for
analyzing civil consequences of criminal convictions going forward, it is helpful to
understand the legal framework that pre-dated these decisions and the context and
content of the decisions themselves.
A. What Is a Civil Consequence of Conviction?
Collateral consequences, or civil consequences that follow a criminal conviction, stem from England’s notion of “civil death” following conviction.35 The
concept of civil death was that, once a citizen had been convicted of a serious
crime, he was effectively excluded from the functioning of civil society, whether
by physical banishment or by complete deprivation of his rights and privileges.36
Although modern American society might not admit to maintaining a system that
imposes civil death, the civil consequences of a conviction “may be the most
significant penalties resulting from a criminal conviction.”37 They affect virtually
every aspect of a person’s life and can range from deportation to additional
incarceration to ineligibility for federal benefits to loss of custody.38
Civil consequences of criminal convictions exist in disparate state and federal
statutes and regulations,39 but generally there are two categories of civil consequences of a criminal conviction. The first is sanctions that flow from the fact of
conviction.40 Within those consequences, some are automatically applied and
some are applied on a discretionary basis, which unsurprisingly leads to wide
variation.41 The second is penalties that follow, often discretionarily, from the

35. See Michael Pinard, Collateral Consequences of Criminal Convictions: Confronting Issues of Race and
Dignity, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 457, 457 n.310 (2010) [hereinafter Pinard, Collateral Consequences].
36. Id.
37. See Roberts, supra note 3, at 181–82 (noting that collateral consequences are often the biggest cost of a
plea in an era of minor adjudications).
38. See Gabriel J. Chin, Race, the War on Drugs, and the Collateral Consequences of Criminal Conviction, 6
J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 253, 259 (2002) [hereinafter Chin, Race] (noting that collateral consequences are often
more severe than the sentence itself); Adrienne Lyles-Chockley, Transitions to Justice: Prisoner Reentry as an
Opportunity to Confront and Counteract Racism, 6 HASTINGS RACE & POVERTY L.J. 259 (2009) (noting that many
consequences are harsher and longer lasting than the imposed jail sentence, including: loss of parental rights;
inability to perform voting and jury services; employment licensing consequences such as real estate, nursing,
physical therapy, and government; inability to obtain a driver’s license and passport; disqualification from
educational grants, loans, and work assistance; and ineligibility for small business loans, mortgages, handgun
licenses, military service, federal welfare benefits, and public housing).
39. See, e.g., Am. Bar Ass’n Criminal Justice Section, Collateral Consequences Project AM. BAR ASS’N,
http://isrweb.isr.temple.edu/projects/accproject/ (last visited Mar. 5, 2012) (listing 38,012 consequences).
40. See AM. BAR ASS’N, ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: COLLATERAL SANCTIONS AND DISCRETIONARY
DISQUALIFICATION OF CONVICTED PERSONS 12 (3d ed. 2004) [hereinafter AM. BAR ASS’N, COLLATERAL SANCTIONS],
http://www.fedcure.org/information/USSC-Symposium-0708/dir_16/Love_collateralsanctions.pdf. For example,
certain convictions can lead to disqualification from voting and jury service, disqualification from federal benefits
ranging from student loans to public housing, and deportation.
41. Id.; Court Security Improvement Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-177, 121 Stat. 2534 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 26 and 28 U.S.C.).

Fn35
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underlying conduct.42
These consequences are imposed by local, state, or federal authorities after
conviction and might go unnoticed in an individual’s life until a particular
circumstance or problem brings them to his or her attention. There is no mechanism in the criminal process to make individuals aware of the range of potential
consequences, either before or after conviction.43 This situation is complicated by
the fact that consequences can apply across jurisdictions: a conviction in one state
can trigger a consequence in another state even when a defendant relocates years
after the conviction.44 Further, once these consequences are imposed, there are
only rare opportunities for a defendant to obtain relief.45 Thus, although as a
society we supposedly base our criminal justice system on the notion that once you
have served your sentence for a crime, you have paid your debt to society and can
start anew,46 the reality is far from this ideal.
Unsurprisingly, these civil consequences of conviction are often a barrier to
successful reentry.47 Depriving individuals access to employment, identification,
relationships with their children, and social services undeniably complicates the
reentry process.48 As a result, governments and non-profit organizations spend

42. For example, those who engage in “drug-related criminal activity” (as determined by a housing agency’s
administrative process, not by the fact of conviction) are excluded from federally funded housing benefits. Thus,
the fact of conviction does not automatically impose the consequence, and a conviction is not the only basis for
imposition of the consequence. See Lease Requirements, 24 C.F.R. § 966.4(l)(f)(12)(i)(B) (2010); see also
Roberts, supra note 3, at 119, 136 n.65 (providing examples of cases where nolo contendere pleas still incur
collateral consequences).
43. See Gabriel J. Chin, Making Padilla Practical: Defense Counsel and Collateral Consequences at Guilty
Plea, 54 HOW. L.J. 675, 688 (2011).
44. See AM. BAR ASS’N, COLLATERAL SANCTIONS, supra note 41, at 22 n.23; Alec C. Ewald, Criminal
Disenfranchisement and the Challenge of American Federalism, 39 PUBLIUS 427, 555 (2009).
45. See generally Margaret Colgate Love, Paying Their Debt to Society: Forgiveness, Redemption, and the
Uniform Collateral Consequences of Conviction Act, 54 HOW. L.J. 753 (2011).
46. See, e.g., Margaret E. Finzen, Systems of Oppression: The Collateral Consequences of Incarceration and
their Effects on Black Communities, 12 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 299, 299 (2005) (“You know you have
made mistakes in the past, but you have learned your lesson and want to start over, this time doing things right.
You are relieved to have finally paid your debt to society—or so you think. Little do you know that numerous
political, social, and economic collateral consequences laws . . . intersect to negatively impact ex-offenders’ lives
and severely punish them long after their sentences have ended.”).
47. See NAT’L DIST. ATT’YS ASS’N, POLICY POSITIONS ON PRISONER REENTRY ISSUES § 4(a), at 7 (2005),
http://www.ndaa.org/pdf/policy_position_prisoner_reentry_july_17_05.pdf (“[T]he lack of employment, housing, transportation, medical services and education for ex-offenders creates barriers to successful reintegration
and must be addressed as part of the reentry discussion.”).
48. See, e.g., Letter from Shaun Donovan, Sec’y of Hous. & Urban Dev., to State Pub. Hous. Auth. Dirs. (June
17, 2011), available at http://www.nhlp.org/files/Rentry%20letter%20from%20Donovan%20to%20PHAs%
206-17-11.pdf (encouraging state directors to allow ex-offenders to rejoin their families in public housing); Letter
from Eric Holder, U.S. Att’y Gen., to State Att’ys Gen. (April 18, 2011), available at http://www.nationalreentryresourcecenter.org/documents/0000/1088/Reentry_Council_AG_Letter.pdf (“Collateral consequence statutes and
policies impose additional burdens on people who have served their sentences, including denial of employment
and housing opportunities, without increasing public safety in essential ways.”); Eric Holder, U.S. Att’y Gen.,
Speech to the European Offenders Employment Forum (Oct. 8, 2010), available at http://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/
ag/speeches/2010/ag-speech-101008.html (“Once those who commit crimes pay their societal debt, we have
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significant resources trying to ensure successful reentry in the face of these
barriers.49 The tension between the desire to successfully reintegrate former
prisoners and the movement to impose civil consequences on those convicted of
crimes is a practical problem, but it also raises fundamental questions of justice
and human rights.50 In particular, the racial disparities in U.S. prison populations
raise serious questions about the role of race in the development, administration,
and effect of civil consequences of criminal convictions.51
There have been a variety of calls for reform of civil consequences of criminal
convictions, from abolishing them to reframing their role in defense lawyering.52
Three reform efforts that have taken hold are the collection and dissemination of
information regarding civil consequences, the development of mechanisms to
provide relief from consequences, and the integration of these consequences into
the sentencing process.
The first area of effort has focused on informing criminal defendants of the
consequences they face, and informing the public of the scope of consequences we
impose. The movement to collect information regarding civil consequences is an
effort to provide notice to defendants of these consequences.53 The American Bar
Association—funded by the 2007 Court Security Act54—has undertaken this effort
and, after its first year, had identified more than 30,000 consequences in a wide
breadth of areas.55 The American Bar Association expects to categorize these

many expectations: that they will reenter our communities, ready to assume a productive role . . . but as all of you
have seen, these expectations are not always met. And while we know that stable employment is one of the keys to
successful reintegration, we also know that it is one of the greatest challenges of reentry.”).
49. See Second Chance Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-199, 122 Stat. 657 (2008) (codified in scattered sections
of 18 and 42 U.S.C.).
50. See Pinard, Collateral Consequences, supra note 36, at 464 & n.309 (suggesting that the reason the United
States has harsher collateral consequences than comparison countries is because the United States uses a narrower
dignity interest and not a human rights framework); Michael Pinard, An Integrated Perspective on the Collateral
Consequences of Criminal Convictions and Reentry Issues Faced by Formerly Incarcerated Individuals, 86
B.U. L. REV. 623, 633 (2006) [hereinafter Pinard, Integrated Perspective] (making the case for collateral
consequences and reentry as “interwoven and integrated components along the criminal justice continuum”).
51. See generally M. Finzen, Systems of Oppression: The Collateral Consequences of Incarceration and Their
Effects on Black Communities, 12 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 299 (2005); Lyles-Chockley, supra note 39
(discussing the inextricability of race and collateral consequences because of the number of black ex-offenders
with poor economic circumstances and deteriorated social networks who experience the double stigma of being
black and an ex-offender).
52. See, e.g., Nora V. Demleitner, “Collateral Damage”: No Re-Entry for Drug Offenders, 47 VILL. L. REV.
1027, 1028 (2002) [hereinafter, “Collateral Damage”] (suggesting that collateral consequences should be
abolished); Michael Pinard, Broadening the Holistic Mindset: Incorporating Collateral Consequences and
Reentry into Criminal Defense Lawyering, 31 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1067 (2004) (discussing movement of criminal
defender offices toward holistic representation).
53. See Chin, Race, supra note 39, at 254 (“Basic fairness requires first that collateral consequences be
collected in one place, and second that persons charged with a crime be notified of what the consequences are
when they plead guilty or are sentenced.”).
54. See Court Security Improvement Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-177, 121 Stat. 2534 (2008) (codified in
scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.).
55. See AM. BAR ASS’N, COLLATERAL SANCTIONS, supra note 41.
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consequences and create a web tool by the summer of 2012 so that defendants can
identify the full impact of their conviction and sentence.56
Another area of reform is creating mechanisms for the restoration of rights,
essentially an application process to free an individual from a particular civil
consequence or set of consequences.57 Some states have an automatic procedure
for relief from civil consequences, some have an administrative procedure by
which defendants can request relief from certain consequences, and some, including the federal system, allow only for pardons.58 It is arguably less politically
controversial to restore the rights of someone who has “earned” it after conviction,
though the Model Penal Code’s recommendation of mechanisms for relief have
not been universally adopted and the state mechanisms for doing so are often
onerous, confusing, and little-used.59 In a related effort, advocates for improved
reentry outcomes are attempting to alleviate the effects of employment consequences by using anti-discrimination laws to sue employers who immediately
reject job applicants based on their criminal records.60
A final area for reform is to integrate civil consequences into sentencing by
requiring courts to inform defendants of the consequences they face, and perhaps
even choosing among consequences at sentencing. This reform draws support
from those interested in disclosure of the full consequences of a conviction, as well
as those who wish to improve sentencing more generally by tailoring the sentence
to the offender.61 It has gained the support of the American Bar Association as part
of its standards for sentencing.62 Indeed, a tailored approach to civil consequences
also exists within certain regulatory schemes.63

56. Id.
57. See Love, supra note 46, at 779–83.
58. Demleitner, “Collateral Damage”, supra note 53, at 1046.
59. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 306.6 (2009).
60. See, e.g., MICHELLE NATIVIDAD RODRIGUEZ & MAURICE EMSELLEM, NAT’L EMP’T LAW PROJECT, 65 MILLION
“NEED NOT APPLY”: THE CASE FOR REFORMING CRIMINAL BACKGROUND CHECKS FOR EMPLOYMENT (2011),
http://nelp.3cdn.net/e9231d3aee1d058c9e_55im6wopc.pdf (proposing employment reforms for those with criminal records); Pinard, Collateral Consequences, supra note 36, at 457 n.197–200 (discussing anti-discrimination
efforts in the employment context and noting that only four states have mechanisms for relief of employmentrelated civil consequences); see also NAT’L EMP’T LAW PROJECT, LEGISLATIVE UPDATE: HOUSE LEADERSHIP BILL
SLASHES UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE 3 (2011), http://www.nelp.org/page/-/UI/2011/Leg_Update_House_
UI_Bill.pdf?nocdn⫽1(identifying current state legislative efforts to reduce barriers to employment for those with
criminal records).
61. See, e.g., Nora V. Demleitner, Smart Public Policy: Replacing Imprisonment with Targeted Nonprison
Sentences and Collateral Sanctions, 58 STAN. L. REV. 339 (2005); Pinard, Integrated Perspective, supra note 51,
at 647 (suggesting that collateral consequences should be tailored to the underlying offense).
62. See AM. BAR ASS’N, COLLATERAL SANCTIONS, supra note 41, § 19-2.4(a), at 3 (“The legislature should
authorize the sentencing court to take into account, and the court should consider, applicable collateral sanctions
in determining an offender’s overall sentence.”); id. at 29 (“In accordance with the generally applicable principles
of the Sentencing Standards, the sentencing court should ensure that the totality of the penalty is not unduly severe
and that it does not give rise to undue disparity.”).
63. See, e.g., David A. Super, Food Stamps and the Criminal Justice System, CHAMPION MAG., Dec. 2001, at
20, available at http://www.nacdl.org/Champion.aspx?id⫽22590 (explaining the requirement of a judicial
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In addition to these reform movements, there have been efforts to limit the effect
of civil consequences of conviction through constitutional protections. For example, civil consequences have been challenged, typically unsuccessfully, as
being violations of the ex post facto or double jeopardy clauses of the federal and
state constitutions.64 Although these challenges continue, there has not been a
consistent trend by courts to view civil consequences generally as a violation of
these clauses.65
This recognition of the import of civil consequences of conviction, and of
movements for their reform is a backdrop for courts’ application of procedural
protections. Although, as discussed above, there have been challenges to these
consequences based on a variety of theories, this Article will consider the
protections afforded these consequences by the criminal process.

Fn64

Fn65

B. Civil Consequences of Conviction in the Courts Before Padilla
Consideration of the civil consequences of conviction during a criminal prosecution arises in the context of what advice criminal counsel owes a defendant who is
pleading guilty. The plea stage is the focus of these challenges because it is a
“critical stage” and thus subject to Sixth Amendment protections, and because a
defendant’s choice to accept a plea—and the information upon which that choice is
based—pose a clear framework for an ineffective assistance of counsel claim.66
Before Padilla, courts used the direct-collateral distinction but applied it inconsistently.67 The spectrum of approaches adopted reflected the difficulty of applying
the direct-collateral distinction to fact-intensive cases, as well as an inclination to
simplify the situation by creating formal rules that did not fit the practical reality of
a defendant’s experience.
Divergence among the courts also stemmed, in part, from a conflation of the due
process and Sixth Amendment analyses that apply to a guilty plea. First, courts can
consider the voluntariness of a plea in accordance with Fifth or Fourteenth

finding for heightened denial of food stamps, and noting that the judge has flexibility to impose another penalty or
no penalty at all); see also 7 C.F.R. §§ 273.16(b)(5), 273.16 (g)(2)(i), 273.16 (h)(2)(i), 273.16 (b)(7) (2011)
(providing relevant regulations for denial of food stamps).
64. See, e.g., Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 105 (2003) (rejecting ex post facto challenge to Alaska’s sexual
offender registration requirement); Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 361 (1997) (holding that Kansas’s civil
commitment law did not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause or the Ex Post Clause); Turner v. Glickman, 207 F.3d
419, 430–31 (7th Cir. 2000) (finding that the denial of certain welfare benefits to felony drug offenders does not
constitute criminal punishment); see also Nora V. Demleitner, A Vicious Cycle: Resanctioning Offenders, in CIVIL
PENALTIES, SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES 185–86 (Christopher Mele & Teresa A. Miller eds., 2005) (“Despite their
debilitating impact on ex-offenders’ lives, courts have generally declined to find such collateral sanctions
punishment for constitutional purposes, largely because legislatures justify them in terms of public safety rather
than retribution.”); Pinard, Integrated Perspective, supra note 51, at 633 (discussing categories of challenges to
collateral consequences).
65. Pinard, Integrated Perspective, supra note 51, at 639–41.
66. McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 (1970).
67. See, e.g., id.
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Amendment due process protections.68 The due process protection is implicated in
the court’s duties when accepting a plea, and the established requirement is that a
judge accepting a guilty plea must determine that a defendant fully understands the
consequences of that plea.69 Second, courts can apply the Sixth Amendment right
to counsel to the plea stage. Under this protection, a defendant’s rights are violated
if the attorney’s performance fell below an “objective standard of reasonable
professional judgment” and the defendant was prejudiced by this behavior.70 For
both the due process and Sixth Amendment protections in the guilty plea context,
courts relied on the distinction between direct and collateral consequences to
decide when the protections were applicable, but the distinction did not necessarily
lead to clarity—or fair results—regarding such applicability.
As to a defendant’s due process rights, courts agreed that there was a difference
between the “direct” consequences of a plea and the “collateral” consequences of a
plea: the due process right applied with regard to the defendant’s awareness of
direct consequences but not of collateral consequences.71 That is, a defendant’s
plea was knowing and intelligent if he was aware of the direct consequences of the
guilty plea, but no such awareness of the collateral consequences was required.72
How to define whether a consequence was direct or collateral was the source of
difficulty for many courts, leading to a variety of tests. For example, some courts
took the view that a direct consequence was defined by the characteristics of its
operation and was a consequence that was “definite, immediate, and largely
automatic.”73 Other courts used a variation on this approach, focusing on the
mechanism for imposing the consequence so that a collateral consequence was one
where “an agent independent of the court” must impose the consequence.74 Still
other courts defined a consequence by its relationship to the sentence, with a
68. See U.S. CONST. amend. V (“U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“[N]or shall any State deprive any person of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law . . . .”); see also Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969)
(finding due process requires a plea agreement to be voluntary).
69. Boykin, 395 U.S. at 243–44. This protection is also codified in rules of procedure. See, e.g., FED. R. CRIM.
P. 11.
70. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984) (outlining a two-prong test for ineffective
assistance of counsel); see also Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58 (1985) (applying Strickland test to guilty pleas).
71. See Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 755 (1970) (concluding an accused must be “fully aware of the
direct consequences” of a guilty plea).
72. See 21 AM. JUR. 2D CRIMINAL LAW § 620 (2012) (collecting cases).
73. See, e.g., United States v. U.S. Currency in the Amount of $228,536.00, 895 F.2d 908, 915 (2d Cir. 1990)
(defining a direct consequence as “definite, immediate, and largely automatic”); United States v. Salerno, 66 F.3d
544, 551 (2d Cir. 1995) (following the U.S. Currency standard, and concluding “[t]hat a defendant who is charged
with a drug offense may later commit another drug offense, the penalty for which would be enhanced as a result of
the original offense, is certainly a foreseeable possibility. But it is neither definite, immediate, nor largely
automatic; hence, the defendant need not be told of this possible consequence in his original plea colloquy.”);
Cuthrell v. Dir., Patuxent Inst., 475 F.2d 1364, 1366 (4th Cir. 1973) (stating that the distinction turns on whether
the result represents a “definite, immediate and largely automatic effect on the range of the defendant’s
punishment”).
74. See, e.g., State v. Rojas-Martinez, 125 P.3d 930, 933 (Utah 2005) (finding that a collateral consequence
exists when “an agent independent of the court” must act to cause the consequence).
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collateral consequence defined as one that is “not related to the length or nature of
the sentence imposed on the basis of the plea.”75 Unsurprisingly, each of these
definitions could lead to broad variation in application.
Courts also differed as to how the direct-collateral distinction translated to the
Sixth Amendment context. As a threshold matter, the distinction’s role was to
determine whether the Sixth Amendment should apply. If it did, then the claim was
subject to the ineffective counsel analysis of Strickland v. Washington.76 Some
courts embraced the distinction completely, finding that collateral consequences
were categorically excluded as the basis of a claim for ineffective assistance of
counsel.77 Other courts found that collateral consequences were included in the
Sixth Amendment’s protections where counsel had affirmatively provided mistaken advice, but not when counsel was silent.78 Regardless of how courts decided
whether a consequence was direct or collateral, this dichotomy was generally
accepted as the central inquiry regarding the applicability of due process or Sixth
Amendment protections to the civil consequences of a criminal conviction at the
plea stage. It was against this backdrop that Padilla v. Kentucky reached the
Supreme Court.

Fn75

Fn76

Fn77

Fn78

C. The Padilla Decision
Jose Padilla—a Honduran native, Vietnam War veteran, and lawful permanent
resident of the United States for more than forty years—was charged with drug
distribution after his tractor-trailer was stopped and found to hold a large quantity
of marijuana.79 Mr. Padilla pled guilty after being told by his attorney that he “did
not have to worry about immigration status since he had been in the country so
long.”80 His attorney was wrong: Mr. Padilla faced a proceeding where, by statute,
his removal was an almost inevitable consequence of Mr. Padilla’s conviction.81
Mr. Padilla brought a post-conviction claim arguing that his Sixth Amendment
right to effective counsel was violated and that under the applicable Strickland

75. See, e.g., United States v. Romero-Vilca, 850 F.2d 177, 179 (3d Cir. 1988) (holding that a collateral
consequence is one “not related to the length or nature of the sentence imposed on the basis of the plea” and
finding no error in court’s failure to advise defendant of deportation consequences of guilty plea during Rule 11
colloquy).
76. 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).
77. See, e.g., Bustos v. White, 521 F.3d 321, 325–26 (4th Cir. 2008) (looking to precedent regarding court’s
obligation to inform defendant of consequences of plea when deciding whether it was ineffective assistance of
counsel to fail to advise client regarding parole eligibility).
78. See, e.g., Rojas-Martinez, 125 P.3d at 933 (concluding that there is no affirmative duty of counsel to advise
a defendant of possible deportation consequences of a guilty plea, but there is a duty to not provide misadvice).
79. Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1477 (2010).
80. Id. at 1478.
81. See id. at 1480 (“Under contemporary law, if a noncitizen has committed a removable offense . . . , his
removal is practically inevitable . . . .”); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(b) (defining “aggravated felony” as
including “illicit trafficking in a controlled substance”); § 1228 (providing for the expedited removal of aliens
convicted of aggravated felonies).
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analysis of deficient and prejudicial performance by counsel, he was entitled to
relief because he would not have entered a plea if he had known of the immigration
consequences.82
The Kentucky Supreme Court applied a categorical exclusion of collateral
consequences from Sixth Amendment protections and rejected Mr. Padilla’s
claim.83 The court specifically found that the exclusion of collateral consequences
from the Sixth Amendment’s protections at the plea stage included both failure of
counsel to advise a client regarding immigration consequences, and affirmative
misadvice regarding these consequences.84 This decision was consistent with
precedent that the plea stage is a “critical stage” of the proceedings and thus
eligible for Sixth Amendment protection, but contrasted with decisions of many
courts that had applied a less stringent rule of exclusion to collateral consequences
in the Sixth Amendment context.85
The Supreme Court granted certiorari, hearing arguments on the difference
between non-advice and misadvice,86 and on the unique character of immigration
law and its interaction with criminal law.87 In particular, the parties supporting Mr.
Padilla leaned heavily, though not exclusively, on the severity of deportation as a
consequence of a guilty plea.88 The Court reversed, in a decision by Justice
Stevens, with a concurrence by Justices Alito and Roberts, and dissents by Justices
Scalia and Thomas. The majority found that the Sixth Amendment applied to Mr.
Padilla’s claim that counsel’s performance was deficient, and remanded for an
analysis of prejudice.89

82. Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1478.
83. Id.; see Commonwealth v. Padilla, 253 S.W.3d 482, 485 (Ky. 2008) (“As collateral consequences are
outside the scope of the guarantee of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, it follows that counsel’s failure to
advise Appellee of such collateral issue or his act of advising Appellee incorrectly provides no basis for relief.”).
84. See Padilla, 253 S.W.3d at 485.
85. See id. at 484 (“Appellee correctly asserts that a number of jurisdictions which have held that failure to
advise of a collateral matter is not ineffective assistance have nevertheless held that there is an exception for cases
where the attorney misadvised the defendant on the consequences of his plea with regard to immigration.”).
86. See Brief for Petitioner at 55, Padilla, 130 S. Ct. 1473 (No. 08-651) (urging misadvice as an obvious
grounds for reversal); Brief for Respondent at 28, Padilla, 130 S. Ct. 1473 (No. 08-651) (drawing distinction
between failure to advise and misadvice); Brief for the United States as Amici Curiae Supporting Affirmance at
20, Padilla, 130 S. Ct. 1473 (No. 08-651) (taking a position on misadvice); Brief for Legal Ethics, Criminal
Procedure, & Criminal Law Professors as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 6, Padilla, 130 S. Ct. 1473 (No.
08-651) [hereinafter Brief for Law Professors as Amici Curiae] (portraying misadvice as demanding reversal).
87. See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 87, at 50 (differentiating deportation from other consequences); Brief
for Respondent, supra note 87, at 36 (arguing that immigration is not different from other collateral consequences); Brief for the United States as Amici Curiae Supporting Affirmance, supra note 87, at 14–15; Brief for
Law Professors as Amici Curiae, supra note 87, at 11–12 (focusing on the “unique” nature of immigration).
88. See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 87, at 50 (differentiating deportation from other consequences); Brief
for Law Professors as Amici Curiae, supra note 87, at 11–12 (focusing on the “unique” nature of immigration).
From a strategic standpoint, this was an excellent decision. However, the parties’, and ultimately the majority’s,
focus on the “unique” nature of immigration consequences does not itself show that immigration consequences
are the only civil consequences of criminal convictions that warrant protection or special consideration.
89. See Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1486–87.
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In this context, the Padilla decision reflects both bold and limited choices. The
decision’s rejection of the direct-collateral distinction for Sixth Amendment
purposes, looking instead to the particular civil consequence on its own terms, is a
bold step. So, too, is the majority’s choice to ground its decision in the practicalities of how immigration consequences of conviction function. These steps are
mitigated, however, by the choice to explicitly limit this reasoning to the immigration consequence of deportation that was presented by Padilla. Yet the concurrence and majority point out that the limitation may be illusory.90 Thus, an open
question is how Padilla will translate to future cases—involving different civil
consequences and different rights. The Padilla decision itself gives some clues as
to what the future holds.

Fn90

1. Replacing the Direct-Collateral Distinction
The majority opinion in Padilla rejected the direct-collateral distinction as it
applied to Sixth Amendment claims. The Court first noted: “We, however, have
never applied a distinction between direct and collateral consequences to define
the scope of constitutionally ‘reasonable professional assistance’ required under
Strickland.”91 The Court then declined to use the distinction, stating that “how to
apply the direct/collateral distinction has no bearing on the disposition of this
case.”92 Backed by these broad conclusions, the Court tethered its analysis of Mr.
Padilla’s Sixth Amendment claim to the facts before it, explaining: “Deportation as
a consequence of a criminal conviction is, because of its close connection to the
criminal process, uniquely difficult to classify as either a direct or a collateral
consequence. The collateral versus direct distinction is thus ill-suited to evaluating
a Strickland claim concerning the specific risk of deportation.”93 The majority then
evaluated the consequence of deportation by inquiring into several of its key
factual characteristics, each of which reflected the practical consideration that
deportation, although technically in the realm of civil law, is entangled in the
substance and process of criminal law when triggered by a criminal conviction.
First, the Court focused on the severity of the consequence and its significance
to the defendant. In the instance of deportation, the Court concluded that “[w]e
have long recognized that deportation is a particularly severe ‘penalty’”94 and “as a
matter of federal law, deportation is an integral part—indeed, sometimes the most
important part—of the penalty that may be imposed on noncitizen defendants who
plead guilty to specified crimes.”95 Finally, the Court noted that “[w]e too have

90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.

See id. at 1485–86, 1488 (Alito, J., concurring).
Id. at 1481.
Id. at 1481 n.8.
Id. at 1482.
Id. at 1481 (quoting Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 740 (1893)).
Id. at 1480.
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previously recognized that preserving the client’s right to remain in the United
States may be more important to the client than any potential jail sentence.”96
It is striking that the majority chose to refer to deportation as a “penalty.”97 A
penalty is
Punishment imposed on a wrongdoer, usu. in the form of imprisonment or fine;
esp., a sum of money exacted as punishment for either a wrong to the state or a
civil wrong (as distinguished from compensation for the injured party’s loss).
Though usu. for crimes, penalties are also sometimes imposed for civil
wrongs.98

The Court’s choice to use this term represents a departure from historical
characterizations of deportation and reflects the Court’s recognition that deportation is not simply some parallel action or result, separate from the criminal
process.99
Second, the Court asked how enmeshed the civil consequence was with the
criminal process. The Court observed that deportation “is not, in a strict sense, a
criminal sanction. Although removal proceedings are civil in nature, deportation is
nevertheless intimately related to the criminal process. Our law has enmeshed
criminal convictions and the penalty of deportation for nearly a century.”100 Based
on the interwoven nature of the civil consequence and the criminal process, the
Court concluded: “[W]e find it most difficult to divorce the penalty from the
conviction in the deportation context. Moreover, we are quite confident that
noncitizen defendants facing a risk of deportation for a particular offense find it
even more difficult.”101
As part of its analysis of the interaction between civil consequence and criminal
process, the Court also noted the inevitability of the civil consequence. The Court
implied that where a civil consequence flows automatically from a criminal
conviction, its inevitability is evidence of the enmeshed nature of the civil
consequence and the criminal process.102 In the case before it, the Court concluded

96. Id. at 1483 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
97. See id. at 1480–81, 1486.
98. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1247 (9th ed. 2009).
99. See Maureen A. Sweeney, Where Do We Go from Padilla v. Kentucky? Thoughts on Implementation and
Future Directions, 45 NEW ENG. L. REV. 353, 355–56 (2011) (“In short, the Court recognized deportation for
criminal behavior as a penalty that results from criminal proceedings, something the Court had consistently and
steadfastly refused to do up until that point. For over one hundred years, the Court had always described
deportation as a civil, remedial sanction, designed not to punish, but to remedy an ongoing violation of the civil
immigration law. This characterization has been the basis for a number of important decisions limiting the
procedural and constitutional rights of respondents in removal proceedings. Padilla, in acknowledging the penal
nature of removal for criminal convictions, represents a significant departure from these prior Supreme Court
characterizations of deportation.”).
100. Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1481 (citations omitted).
101. Id.
102. See id.
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“removal is practically inevitable but for the possible exercise of limited remnants
of equitable discretion vested in the Attorney General”103 and that “changes in our
immigration law have made removal nearly an automatic result for a broad class of
noncitizen offenders.”104
Third, the Court evaluated whether giving legal advice regarding the civil
consequence was an uncomplicated task. In the immigration context, the Court
concluded that the relevant statute was “succinct, clear, and explicit in defining the
removal consequence for Padilla’s conviction.”105 This clarity supported the
application of Sixth Amendment protections to the immigration consequence of
the conviction.106 The Court noted, though, that “[w]hen the law is not succinct
and straightforward,” counsel’s advice need only be that there may be immigration
consequences of some kind.107
Finally, the Court grounded its decision in a prediction of its practical application, noting that the implementation of Sixth Amendment protections would be
beneficial to all players: “[I]nformed consideration of possible deportation can
only benefit both the State and noncitizen defendants during the plea-bargaining
process. By bringing deportation consequences into this process, the defense and
prosecution may well be able to reach agreements that better satisfy the interests of
both parties.”108
2. Predicting Broad Application
The Padilla decision had five Justices supporting the majority opinion, a
concurrence, and a dissent. Notably, all of the opinions agreed that Mr. Padilla’s
plea experience was unfair, and only disagreed as to exactly which part of the
experience warranted relief. Justice Alito’s concurrence and Justice Scalia’s
dissent disagreed with the logic of the majority’s decision, and noted that this logic
is difficult to confine to deportation. Although the Padilla decision plainly
considered only the civil consequence of deportation, the framework it used is
arguably applicable beyond that one consequence.
While agreeing with the majority’s conclusion as to affirmative misadvice,
Justice Alito’s concurrence disagreed with, but seemed to begrudgingly accept,
that this conclusion would spread to other consequences of conviction. He began
his concurrence by underscoring the breadth of civil consequences that defendants
may face:

103. Id. at 1480.
104. Id. at 1481.
105. Id. at 1483.
106. See id. (“This is not a hard case in which to find deficiency: The consequences of Padilla’s plea could
easily be determined from reading the removal statute, his deportation was presumptively mandatory, and his
counsel’s advice was incorrect.”).
107. Id.
108. Id. at 1486.
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[C]riminal convictions can carry a wide variety of consequences other than
conviction and sentencing, including civil commitment, civil forfeiture, the
loss of the right to vote, disqualification from public benefits, ineligibility to
possess firearms, dishonorable discharge from the Armed Forces, and loss of
business or professional licenses. A criminal conviction may also severely
damage a defendant’s reputation and thus impair the defendant’s ability to
obtain future employment or business opportunities. All of those consequences
are “seriou[s],” but this Court has never held that a criminal defense attorney’s
Sixth Amendment duties extend to providing advice about such matters.109

Fn109

Justice Alito went on to observe that the majority’s holding requiring advice as to
deportation alone would only complicate matters, and that
if defense counsel must provide advice regarding only one of the many
collateral consequences of a criminal conviction, many defendants are likely to
be misled. . . . Incomplete legal advice may be worse than no advice at all
because it may mislead and may dissuade the client from seeking advice from a
more knowledgeable source.110

Thus, the concurrence concluded, the majority went too far in requiring advice and
should have confined its decision to banning affirmative misadvice.111 Justice Alito
explained that this conclusion was preferable because incompetent advice distorts
the decision-making process and counsel without expertise as to immigration
consequences should be encouraged to refer the defendant to another attorney, or
at least to say, “I do not know.”112
Even though Justice Alito disagreed with the majority’s decision to require
advice—rather than simply ban affirmative misadvice—regarding immigration
consequences, his concurrence seems to accept two key elements of the majority’s
decision. First, it accepts that there is a problem with criminal defendants who are
unaware of the civil consequences of their guilty plea.113 Indeed, Justice Alito
seems to believe a legislative remedy is forthcoming, noting “a rule prohibiting
unreasonable misadvice regarding exceptionally important collateral matters would
not deter or interfere with ongoing political and administrative efforts to devise fair
and reasonable solutions to the difficult problem posed by defendants who plead
guilty without knowing of certain important collateral consequences.”114 Second,

109. Id. at 1488 (Alito, J., concurring).
110. Id. at 1491.
111. See id.
112. See id. at 1493; see also id. at 1494 (“When a criminal defense attorney is aware that a client is an alien,
the attorney should advise the client that a criminal conviction may have adverse consequences under the
immigration laws and that the client should consult an immigration specialist if the client wants advice on that
subject.”).
113. See id. at 1494 (discussing the unfairness in accepting guilty pleas from aliens who are unaware of the
collateral consequence of deportation).
114. Id. at 1493.
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Justice Alito noted the breadth of collateral consequences, at least implicitly
recognized that immigration is not really unique, and did not attempt to reinforce
the majority’s limitation of its logic to only immigration.115 Thus, it seems that
Justice Alito believed that accepting the majority’s logic as to immigration would
mean applying that logic to at least some other consequences.
Justice Scalia’s dissent directly addressed the issue of the application of the
majority’s decision to other consequences. Justice Scalia noted that the logic of the
majority’s decision cannot be limited to the consequence of deportation “except by
judicial caprice.”116 Indeed, his dissent concludes that there is “no logical stoppingpoint” to the duty to advise about collateral consequences.117 Justice Scalia noted:
“It is difficult to believe that the warning requirement would not be extended, for
example, to the risk of heightened sentences in later federal prosecutions pursuant
to the Armed Career Criminal Act.”118 Thus, Justice Scalia explicitly addressed
and opposed what Justice Alito seemed to implicitly accept: that the majority’s
decision will inevitably apply to consequences of conviction beyond immigration.119

Fn115

Fn116
Fn117

Fn118

Fn119

3. Application Beyond Deportation
The extrapolation of Padilla’s analysis of deportation to other consequences is a
logical one for several reasons. First, other consequences share the characteristics
of deportation identified in Padilla as the basis for providing Sixth Amendment
protection. The majority opinion relies on the “unique” nature of deportation, but
describes this uniqueness in terms of the importance of the consequence and its
entanglement with the criminal process. While these things are true as to deportation, they are also true as to other consequences. The concurring and dissenting
opinions, which complain that the majority’s opinion is hard to constrain, recognize this reality, but are perhaps inaccurate in that the solution to this breadth is not
to return to the direct-collateral distinction but rather to embrace the opportunity
presented by the majority opinion.
Second, lower courts have not treated deportation as unique, before or after
Padilla. Cases preceding Padilla regarding affirmative misadvice recognized the
similarity between deportation and other consequences, and concluded that misadvice concerning a range of consequences was ineffective assistance of counsel.120

115. See id. at 1488.
116. Id. at 1496 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
117. See id.
118. Id. The Armed Career Criminal Act provides sentencing enhancements when an individual has qualifying
prior convictions; thus, Justice Scalia seems to be suggesting that Padilla will require counsel in an earlier
predicate prosecution to advise a defendant that a future sentence may be enhanced by the fact of that earlier plea.
See 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) (2006).
119. See id.
120. See, e.g., Hill v. Lockhart, 894 F.2d 1009, 1010 (8th Cir. 1990) (en banc) (“[T]he erroneous paroleeligibility advice given to Mr. Hill was ineffective assistance of counsel under Strickland v. Washington.”); Sparks

Fn120
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Unsurprisingly, cases applying Padilla to allegations of misadvice as to consequences other than deportation have continued to hold this view.121
Third, the Padilla decision rejected the stark distinction between direct and
collateral consequences and instead chose to examine the consequence specifically
and in the relevant context. As a matter of logic, it would be wholly inconsistent to
reject a bright-line rule in the context presented in Padilla but then apply a strict
rule as to other civil consequences of conviction.122 There is no reason why the
fact-specific inquiry that the Court made in Padilla should not be applied in a
different context.

Fn121

Fn122

D. The Turner Decision
Padilla was an examination of the right to counsel in the context of the
protections afforded a civil consequence in the criminal process. The Supreme
Court addressed the reverse—the right to counsel as it applies to a criminal
consequence of a civil proceeding—in its more recent decision in Turner v.
Rogers.123 Although the Turner decision emerges from a different body of law, it
yield insights based on the parallels between Sixth Amendment and due process
right-to-counsel jurisprudence.
Mr. Turner was the defendant in a civil contempt proceeding, convened due to
his repeated failure to pay child support.124 The opposing party was the child’s
mother, and neither party was represented by counsel.125 At the contempt hearing,

v. Sowders, 852 F.2d 882, 885 (6th Cir. 1988) (“[G]ross misadvice concerning parole eligibility can amount to
ineffective assistance of counsel.”); Strader v. Garrison, 611 F.2d 61, 65 (4th Cir. 1979) (“[T]hough parole
eligibility dates are collateral consequences of the entry of a guilty plea of which a defendant need not be informed
if he does not inquire, when he is grossly misinformed about it by his lawyer, and relies upon that misinformation,
he is deprived of his constitutional right to counsel.”); see also United States v. Kwan, 407 F.3d 1005, 1015 (9th
Cir. 2005) (adopting affirmative misadvice rule in immigration context); United States v. Couto, 311 F.3d 179,
188 (2d Cir. 2002) (same); In re Resendiz, 19 P.3d 1171, 1174 (Cal. 2001) (same).
121. See, e.g., Bauder v. Dep’t of Corr., 619 F.3d 1272 (11th Cir. 2010) (finding ineffective assistance of
counsel where counsel affirmatively misadvised defendant that he would not be exposed to civil commitment by
pleading guilty); Webb v. State, 334 S.W.3d 126 (Mo. 2011) (finding that misadvice from counsel regarding
parole eligibility for plea was sufficient for prima facie ineffective assistance claim and holding that “where
counsel misinforms the client as to the effects of the client’s plea, the counsel has rendered ineffective
representation”); Wilson v. State, 244 P.3d 535 (Alaska Ct. App. 2010) (finding that misadvice from counsel that
no-contest plea could not be used against defendant in expected civil suit was sufficient for prima facie ineffective
assistance claim); Pridham v. Commonwealth, No. 2008-CA-002190-MR, 2010 WL 4668961, at *3 (Ky. Ct. App.
Nov. 19, 2010) (concluding that “gross misadvice concerning parole eligibility may amount to ineffective
assistance of counsel worthy of post-conviction relief”).
122. See Peter L. Markowitz, Deportation Is Different, 13 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1299, 1333 (2011) (predicting
that Padilla portends a shift in immigration law because it rejects the concept of immigration law as purely civil
and thus will be a “pivot point” for the Court to treat deportation, and perhaps other areas, as quasi-criminal and
develop protections accordingly).
123. 131 S. Ct. 2507 (2011).
124. Id. at 2513.
125. Id. The child’s maternal grandfather was also a party to the proceedings, as he had physical custody of the
child. Id.
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a civil proceeding, Mr. Turner was found to be in willful contempt and sentenced
to twelve months in prison, a sentence he could purge by paying all back
benefits.126 Although the law required the judge to find that Mr. Turner was able to
pay his back child support before imposing incarceration, the court made no
specific finding regarding the issue and did not even complete a prewritten form
that required circling a choice indicating a defendant’s employment and ability to
pay.127
In civil contempt cases, the basis for a right-to-counsel claim is due process
protections rather than Sixth Amendment protections, and these due process
protections are more limited than in the criminal context.128 To evaluate what due
process rights apply in a civil proceeding, a court inquires as to: “(1) the private
interest that will be affected . . . ; (2) the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such
interest through the procedures used, and probable value, if any, of additional
procedural safeguards; and (3) the [countervailing] interest [in not providing
additional or substitute procedural safeguards].”129 In practice, due process protections have led courts to find that counsel is a necessary protection in at least some
civil proceedings where there is the risk of incarceration.130 However, this right to
counsel is a limited one that appears to be driven by considerations of similarity
between the civil proceeding and criminal proceedings.131 The particular question
presented in Turner—whether there is a due process right to counsel in childsupport contempt proceedings—is one that had divided lower courts, some of

126. See id. (internal citations omitted).
127. See id. at 2513–14.
128. See Hicks v. Feiock, 485 U.S. 624, 637–40 (1988) (holding that the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due
Process Clause allows a State to provide fewer procedural protections in a civil contempt proceeding than in a
criminal case).
129. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 321 (1976); see Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 27–31
(1981) (applying the Mathews framework to a consideration of the right to counsel in a child custody proceeding).
130. See Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 26–27 (establishing “the presumption that an indigent litigant has a right to
appointed counsel only when, if he loses, he may be deprived of his physical liberty,” but denying counsel in the
case at bar); Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 496–97 (1980) (plurality holding that Fourteenth Amendment requires
representation in proceeding to commit inmate to mental facility, but controlling decision finds no right to
counsel); Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 789-90 (1973) (applying a case-by-case approach to the right to
counsel for criminal defendants facing revocation of probation and resulting imprisonment, and noting that
[a]lthough the presence and participation of counsel will probably be both undesirable and constitutionally
unnecessary in most revocation hearings,” some cases may require the state to provide counsel); In re Gault, 387
U.S. 1, 41 (1967) (noting that the Fourteenth Amendment requires state-provided counsel in a civil juvenile
delinquency proceeding which could lead to incarceration); In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 468 F. 2d 1368, 1369
(9th Cir. 1972) (per curiam) (finding a general right to counsel in civil contempt proceedings); Duval v. Duval,
322 A.2d 1, 3–4 (N.H. 1974) (finding no general right in civil contempt, but counsel may be required on
case-by-case basis).
131. Cf. In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 35 (applying pre-Mathews test but noting that proceeding was little different
from and “comparable in seriousness” to criminal proceeding).
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which had found a clear right to counsel, some no right, and some a right in only
certain circumstances.132
In Turner, a 5 to 4 decision authored by Justice Breyer, the Court reiterated its
longstanding premise that due process only requires counsel in certain civil
proceedings, and considered whether Mr. Turner’s case presented such a proceeding.133 As a threshold matter, the Court reaffirmed that there is a presumption of a
right to counsel only in those proceedings where incarceration is at issue, but
rejected the conclusion that counsel is required in all such proceedings.134 The
Court then evaluated Mr. Turner’s particular circumstances using the Mathews v.
Eldridge test to determine what protections were required to render the proceedings fundamentally fair.135 In applying the Mathews test, the Court found that the
“private interest that will be affected argues strongly for the right to counsel
here.”136 The Court identified the interest of Mr. Turner that was affected—namely
his liberty in the face of a twelve-month jail sentence—and concluded that the
threat of incarceration strongly favored a right to counsel.137 However, the Court
then concluded that the issue of the defendant’s ability to pay was sufficiently
straightforward, the unrepresented opposing party was sufficiently symmetrical,
and the substitute safeguards such as forms explaining the legal standard and an
opportunity to respond to questions at a hearing were sufficiently protective to
provide adequate substitute procedural safeguards.138 Because the opposing party
was another individual rather than the government, the Court found this factor
strongly weighed against a right to counsel.139
Ultimately, the Court concluded that although counsel was not required,140 there

132. Compare Ridgway v. Baker, 720 F.2d 1409, 1415 (5th Cir. 1983) (finding a right to counsel for indigents
facing imprisonment in a child-support contempt proceeding under the Constitution); Black v. Div. of Child
Support Enforcement, 686 A.2d 164, 168 (Del. 1996) (same); Mead v. Batchlor, 460 N.W.2d 493, 504 (Mich.
1990) (same), and Pasqua v. Council, 892 A.2d 663, 671–74 (N.J. 2006) (same), with Andrews v. Walton, 428
So.2d 663, 666 (Fla. 1983) (finding “no circumstances in which a parent is entitled to court-appointed counsel in a
civil contempt proceeding for failure to pay child support”), and Rodriguez v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Ct. ex rel.
Cnty. of Clark, 102 P.3d 41, 51 (Nev. 2004) (finding no right to counsel in civil contempt hearing for nonsupport,
except in “rarest of cases”).
133. See Turner v. Rogers, 131 S. Ct. 2507, 2516 (2011).
134. See id. at 2517 (“We believe . . . that the Court previously had found a right to counsel ‘only’ in cases
involving incarceration, not that a right to counsel exists in all such cases . . . .”) (emphasis in original).
135. Id. at 2517–18 (citing Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976)).
136. Id. at 2510 (internal quotations omitted).
137. See id. at 2518.
138. See id. at 2518–19.
139. See id. at 2519 (“A requirement that the State provide counsel to the noncustodial parent . . . could create
an asymmetry of representation that would alter significantly the nature of the proceeding.”) (citation and
quotation omitted). Interestingly, the Court explicitly noted that its conclusion did not apply to cases where the
government is attempting to collect support payments. See id. at 2520 (“We do not address civil contempt
proceedings where the underlying child support payment is owed to the State . . . .”).
140. The Court based its conclusion that counsel was not required on the premise of Gagnon v. Scarpelli, a
case that found no right to counsel in probation revocation hearings. See id. at 2518–19 (citing Gagnon v.
Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 789–90 (1973)). Interestingly, after Gagnon was decided, the FEDERAL RULES OF
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were not sufficient alternative procedures implemented, such as explanatory forms
and specific judicial findings, to safeguard Mr. Turner’s rights.141 Thus, although
Mr. Turner had no right to counsel in his civil contempt proceeding, he was
nonetheless deprived of due process because he did not receive notice regarding
the importance of the issue of ability to pay.142 At least implicitly, then, Turner
recognizes and incorporates the practical operation of civil proceedings threatening incarceration.
Although Turner started from a different entry point than Padilla—a civil rather
than criminal proceeding and thus a due process rather than Sixth Amendment
analysis143—the two cases share similarities that underscore the applicability of
the Padilla decision beyond deportation. In both cases, the Court rejected an
analysis grounded in strict categorical distinctions (direct-collateral in Padilla144
and civil-criminal in Turner145) and instead embraced a fact-specific inquiry. This
consistent choice underscores the Court’s conviction that the civil consequences of
criminal convictions must each be considered on their own terms.
The Padilla decision is notable for its consideration of the practical realities of
criminal defendants facing deportation. The Court relied heavily on the near
certain consequence of removal for Mr. Padilla.146 It also buttressed its conclusion
that the Sixth Amendment applied with the observation that the practical application of its decision would be advantageous for all parties.147
The Turner decision also reflected the practicality of counsel in civil proceedings that function more like criminal proceedings. In Turner, the Court engaged in
a factual inquiry into the nature of the contempt proceeding to which Mr. Turner
was subject, and specifically noted factual circumstances where a different
requirement for counsel might apply.148 This fact-specific approach and its
consideration of context is the basis for the two core considerations that the
opinions in Padilla and Turner share. First, both opinions focused on the
significance of the consequence at issue and, second, both opinions focus on the
interaction between the civil and criminal processes. These two core considerations shape the framework developed in this Article, and underscore how the
increasing interaction of civil and criminal law in our society argues for a

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE were amended to provide for counsel in such hearings. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 32.1 advisory
committee’s note.
141. See id. Thus, although Gagnon remains precedent, Turner acknowledges that some procedural protections are nonetheless warranted—and in some circumstances may require counsel.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 2512.
144. Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1481 (2010).
145. Turner, 131 S. Ct. at 2521.
146. Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1483.
147. Id. at 1486.
148. Turner, 131 S. Ct. at 2519.

Fn141

Fn142

Fn143

Fn144
Fn145

Fn146

Fn147

Fn148

2012]

SIGNIFICANT ENTANGLEMENTS

1411

comprehensive and coherent framework for considering rights in blended situations.
III. THE NEW CIVIL CONSEQUENCES TEST
Padilla and Turner provide the starting point for a new doctrine for the civil
consequences of criminal convictions. As there are bound to be continuing legal
challenges in this area, defining the parameters of future court inquiries regarding
Sixth Amendment protections for the civil consequences of criminal convictions
can guide this future analysis. Such a framework can provide consistency in how
courts address the disparate consequences that defendants face. This Article
articulates the significant entanglement framework—a new analysis for whether
the imposition of a civil consequence of a criminal conviction gives rise to Sixth
Amendment protections. This new framework encompasses an observation and
two elements: First, the direct-collateral distinction is no longer applicable or
useful. Second, a key consideration in whether the Sixth Amendment should apply
is the significance of the consequence to the defendant. And third, the entanglement between the civil consequence and criminal law will determine whether
protections apply.
This Section describes the significant entanglement framework and goes on to
apply the framework in the context of Sixth Amendment protections at the plea
stage. The application of the significant entanglement framework to specific civil
consequences in different contexts is meant less to resolve the protections that
should be afforded any single consequence, and more to illustrate that the
framework is a useful mechanism for a fact-specific inquiry into what protections
should be afforded a particular consequence for a particular defendant at a
particular stage in the criminal process. The Section goes on to discuss how the
framework can guide analysis of Sixth Amendment protections at other critical
stages in the criminal process. Finally, the Section considers how the framework
might guide the analysis of the due process protections afforded a criminal trial.
A. The Direct-Collateral Distinction Is Gone
One result of the Padilla decision is that the threshold inquiry for applying Sixth
Amendment protections is no longer whether a civil consequence is a direct or
collateral consequence of a criminal conviction. The Court explicitly rejected this
distinction as a one-size-fits-all answer for addressing Sixth Amendment protections, noting that it had never used this test and the test was ill-suited for
immigration consequences.149 Instead of relying on this distinction, the Court
embraced a more detailed analysis.150 Although the Court attempted to justify its

149. Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1481.
150. See Sweeney, supra note 100, at 353 (“One important aspect of the Padilla decision was the Court’s
refusal to apply the distinction between direct and collateral consequences of a criminal conviction to define the
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fact-specific inquiry by noting the particular characteristics of the consequence of
deportation,151 at the very least, the same logic would require inquiring into the
particular characteristics of another consequence under consideration for Sixth
Amendment protections. Although Turner was a consideration of due process
protections in a civil proceeding, the Court took the same general approach:
inquiring into the details of the particular procedural circumstance and consequence at issue.152 Thus, the first lesson of Padilla is that the direct-collateral
distinction is no longer a necessary framework for inquiring into whether the Sixth
Amendment applies to advice concerning a civil consequence at the plea stage.
In decisions following Padilla, courts have embraced this new approach and
inquired into the factual details of how the civil consequence actually operates in
order to decide whether Sixth Amendment protections are warranted. For example,
in Commonwealth v. Abraham, a case currently pending appeal in the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, the court noted that “Padilla harkens back to the original
Strickland concept . . . of examining the totality of the circumstances to determine
what advice must be given to have a fully informed guilty plea.”153 Although some
cases have only implicitly accepted Padilla’s guidance as instructing them to reject
the direct-collateral distinction and engage in a factual inquiry, it is clear that
Padilla has been accepted as providing this guidance.154 Future considerations of
whether a particular civil consequence of a criminal conviction is entitled to Sixth
Amendment protections are likely to embrace a fact-specific inquiry.

Fn151

Fn152

Fn153

Fn154

B. Significance to Defendant
Padilla and Turner provide guidance regarding the key areas of factual inquiry
for a court considering a civil consequence of conviction. The first of these is the
significance of the civil consequence to the defendant. In Padilla, the significance
of the penalty of deportation was plainly a consideration.155 The majority opinion
characterized this consequence as a “drastic measure” that is “sometimes the most
important part of the penalty that may be imposed.”156 In Turner, this same
consideration detailed the “private interest that will be affected,” namely the
“defendant’s loss of personal liberty through imprisonment.”157 Assessing whether
the consequence is significant to the defendant potentially includes several related

scope of representation required by the Sixth Amendment in the case of deportation consequences. In other words,
the Court recognized the protections of the Sixth Amendment to cover advice by criminal defense counsel about
the immigration consequences of a criminal proceeding, regardless of whether those consequences might be
characterized as direct or collateral.”).
151. Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1478.
152. Turner, 131 S. Ct. at 2512–14.
153. 996 A.2d 1090, 1092 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2010).
154. See infra notes 195–97.
155. See Padilla, 130 S. Ct. 1473.
156. Id. at 1478, 1480.
157. Turner, 131 S. Ct. at 2518.
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issues, such as the severity of the consequence, the subjective importance to the
defendant, and the stage in the process.
In Padilla, Justice Stevens began the analysis of whether Strickland’s Sixth
Amendment protections applied by noting: “We have long recognized that deportation is a particularly severe ‘penalty.’”158 The majority also repeatedly returned
to the importance of a deportation consequence in a defendant’s decision to plead
guilty.159 Thus, “[t]he severity of deportation—the equivalent of banishment or
exile—only underscores how critical it is for counsel to inform her noncitizen
client that he faces a risk of deportation.”160 As a corollary, once the Court decided
to apply the Sixth Amendment and a Strickland analysis to Mr. Padilla’s claim, the
harshness of the penalty was a part of the calculus of whether counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.161 In this analysis,
particularly harsh consequences tend to be those that competent counsel should be
aware of.162 Similarly, the second Strickland prong necessarily incorporates the
harshness of the penalty as part of an analysis of whether the defendant suffered
prejudice.163
A similar concern was expressed in Turner. Part of the due process analysis of
whether counsel was required in this civil contempt proceeding was the “private
interest that [would] be affected.”164 This component essentially requires a court to
look at the severity of the penalty that will result from the civil proceeding.165 In
Turner, the Court concluded: “That interest consists of an indigent defendant’s loss
of personal liberty through imprisonment. The interest in securing that freedom,
the freedom from bodily restraint, lies at the core of the liberty protected by the
Due Process Clause.”166 Thus, in the due process context, the severity of the
penalty of imprisonment is a key consideration in deciding whether to establish
procedural protections. Those consequences that threaten an individual’s liberty—
whether by imposing incarceration or removal from the country—plainly meet the
severity and importance threshold. Perhaps one way of expressing that something
is significant enough to meet the threshold is when the consequence is itself a
penalty. In Padilla, the conclusion that “as a matter of federal law, deportation is an
integral part—indeed, sometimes the most important part—of the penalty that may

158. Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1478 (quoting Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 740 (1893)).
159. See id. at 1480–82.
160. Id. at 1486 (internal quotation and citation omitted).
161. See id. at 1483 (noting general consensus in the legal community that counsel should advice as to
immigration consequences, and further noting that “numerous practice guides” could assist counsel in providing
this advice).
162. See id.
163. The Supreme Court remanded to the Kentucky Supreme Court the issue of prejudice to Mr. Padilla. Id. at
1483–84.
164. Turner, 131 S. Ct. at 2517–18.
165. Id. at 2517–18.
166. Id. at 2518 (internal quotations marks omitted).

Fn158

Fn159

Fn160

Fn161

Fn162

Fn163

Fn164
Fn165

Fn166

1414

AMERICAN CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 49:1387

be imposed on noncitizen defendants who plead guilty to specified crimes” was
central to the Court’s decision to apply Sixth Amendment protections.167
A related inquiry is the subjective importance of the consequence to the
defendant. Although this inquiry is often intertwined with the severity of the
consequence, as a more severe consequence is logically more likely to be
subjectively important to a defendant, the question is a distinct one. The importance to the defendant is best expressed as whether the consequence affects the
defendant’s decision-making regarding a guilty plea: Is the consequence a determinative factor in the defendant’s decision whether or not to plead guilty? For
example, in the deportation context, the circumstances surrounding a defendant’s
return to her home country may make the issue of deportation more or less
important to that defendant. The majority opinion in Padilla implicitly recognizes
this issue, noting that “[t]here can be little doubt that, as a general matter, alien
defendants considering whether to enter into a plea agreement are acutely aware of
the immigration consequences of their convictions”168 and that the “impact of
deportation on families living lawfully in this country demand[s] no less” than
Sixth Amendment protections.169 Indeed, a question posed to counsel at oral
argument—whether counsel should advise a defendant of the immigration consequences of a plea when that defendant would be killed upon return to her home
country—identifies this very issue.170 This inquiry has as its corollary the due
process inquiry in Turner into whether a process implicates a fundamental
interest.171
A consideration in the issue of significance is the stage of proceedings at issue.
In Padilla, the issue was whether counsel had properly advised regarding deportation consequences at the plea stage.172 As a defendant’s decision whether to plead
guilty is perhaps the most significant decision in the criminal process, there is
weight in the procedural posture itself.173 Of course, this logic follows as
constitutional rights in the criminal context are defined and applied according to
the stage in the proceedings, so it is no surprise that the significance of a
consequence—and the rights associated with it—are affected by the procedural
posture.174

167. See Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1480.
168. Id. at 1481–82 (internal quotation marks omitted).
169. See id. at 1486.
170. Oral Argument at 37:24–40:12, Padilla, 130 S. Ct. 1473 (No. 08-651), available at http://www.
supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/08-651.pdf.
171. See Turner, 131 S. Ct. at 2518 (“The ‘private interest that will be affected’ argues strongly for the right to
counsel that Turner advocates.”).
172. See id.
173. See Stephanos Bibas, Regulating the Plea-Bargaining Market: From Caveat Emptor to Consumer
Protection, 99 CAL. L. REV. 1117 (2011) (discussing significance of Padilla and its focus on the reality of guilty
pleas).
174. See infra notes 233–34 and accompanying text.
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C. Entanglement of Civil and Criminal Law
Another area of inquiry framed by the decisions in Padilla and Turner is the
entanglement of civil and criminal law in a particular civil consequence of a
criminal conviction. In Padilla, the entanglement manifested itself in the fact that
deportation is “virtually automatic” after a defendant is convicted.175 Further, the
Court concluded that, although deportation is nominally civil, it is functionally
integrated into the criminal process.176 The Court noted that deportation is
“intimately related to the criminal process” and that the law “has enmeshed
criminal convictions and the penalty of deportation for nearly a century.”177 It is
important to note, however, that the majority in Padilla reached this conclusion
even though Mr. Padilla would have had the opportunity for a removal hearing,
albeit with a very limited scope.178
As Padilla suggests, the role of the criminal process in the imposition of the
civil consequence is a crucial consideration. For example, if the criminal court
essentially controls the outcome with regard to the civil consequence, then the two
areas are entangled. Thus, deportation is entangled because it is, practically, an
automatic extension of the criminal proceeding rather than a separate proceeding
or function of the law.
In Turner, the Court also acknowledged the importance of the consideration of
the nature of the proceedings, and particularly the role of the government.179
Although the Court in Turner found that there can be sufficient procedural
protections in a child support contempt proceeding without a right to counsel, it
also explicitly noted that its holding does not extend to circumstances where the
government, rather than a custodial spouse, is the adverse party.180 Thus, although
its particular holding was constrained to the facts of the case, the Court in Turner
seemed to acknowledge that a civil proceeding with the government as a party,
with the essentially criminal penalty of incarceration, may require protections
more typical of a criminal process. Along these same lines, the Court in Turner
noted the effect of the distinction between civil and criminal contempt on a
defendant—the greater potential for wrongful incarceration if procedural protections were denied due to classification of civil contempt as non-criminal—further
underscoring the Court’s inclination to consider the reality of these proceedings on

175. Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1481.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. See Reply Brief of Petitioner at n.8, Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1477 (No. 08-651) (noting that removal
proceeding was stayed pending criminal appeal); see also NORTON TOOBY & JOSEPH ROLLIN, CRIMINAL DEFENSE
OF IMMIGRANTS § 2.15 (4th ed. 2007) (describing how a convicted felon can be relieved of deportation
consequences only in exceptional circumstances such as a showing that he will be tortured if deported).
179. See Turner v. Rogers, 131 S. Ct. 2507, 2520 (2011).
180. See id.
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an individual.181 The Turner opinion essentially incorporates a consideration of
entanglement into its due process analysis.
As the example of deportation suggests, one way to evaluate the entanglement
of the civil and criminal law is to look at the relevant statutory scheme. Where a
legislature has chosen to make the conviction operate past the imposed sentence of
incarceration or fine through another civil consequence, without any additional
process, the legislature is likely to have created sufficient entanglement under this
framework. Conversely, where a legislature has created a separate civil proceeding, triggered by the conviction, to apply or otherwise consider the civil consequence, the legislature’s choice to separate the two processes likely means that
there is not an entanglement. In the former instance, the significant entanglement
framework suggests that Sixth Amendment—and perhaps other—protections are
appropriate. In the latter instance, protections may not be warranted.
D. If There Is a Significant Entanglement, Protections Apply
Padilla and Turner suggest, then, that if a civil consequence meets the
significant entanglement framework, the protections of the Sixth Amendment
apply. In the context of the right to counsel, this test has logical appeal: if a
consequence is effectively a criminal penalty, then it should be afforded corresponding protections. In the due process context there is a corollary logic: if an
individual is subject to a severe penalty via a civil proceeding, then some base
level of procedural protection is warranted. In the circumstance of a civil
consequence of a criminal conviction, where no separate civil proceeding necessarily occurs and thus no process is afforded, it makes sense to afford protections
where the process does occur: in the criminal prosecution.
An interesting issue raised by Turner, beyond the scope of Padilla, is whether
there are civil consequences of criminal convictions that do not warrant the
effective assistance of counsel during the criminal prosecution because a separate
civil process is provided. Yet, these consequences require some level of due
process protection in that separate civil process. One can imagine immigration
processes that could have been provided to Mr. Padilla that would have made his
Sixth Amendment claim unsuccessful. For example, if immigration law were such
that, after his conviction, Mr. Padilla was afforded a hearing where the government
would need to make a showing beyond the fact of conviction in order to deport Mr.
Padilla, then it is likely that this separate process would have changed the Supreme
Court’s view of the protections regarding his criminal plea. (Indeed, a version of
this alternative scenario once existed, and the shift from a distinct and separate

181. See id. at 2518 (“Moreover, the fact that ability to comply marks a dividing line between civil and
criminal contempt reinforces the need for accuracy. That is because an incorrect decision (wrongly classifying the
contempt proceeding as civil) can increase the risk of wrongful incarceration by depriving the defendant of the
procedural protections (including counsel) that the Constitution would demand in a criminal proceeding.”).
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process to a nearly automatic outcome was a focus of the majority’s opinion in
Padilla.)182 In this hypothetical scenario, the entanglement prong would not have
been met. However, Mr. Padilla would then have faced a situation contemplated by
Turner: a civil proceeding with severe consequences and the government as an
adverse party. In this situation, following the suggestion of Turner, Mr. Padilla
would be entitled to due process protections that might include counsel. Thus, even
in situations where the entanglement prong may not be met in a way that requires
Sixth Amendment protections at a criminal proceeding, analogous but distinct due
process protections may apply.
The significant entanglement framework addresses whether a particular protection should apply, but not the merits of the claim itself. Thus, the application of the
particular protection that applies may or may not reveal a successful claim
regarding a particular civil consequence. So, in the Sixth Amendment context, if
the significant entanglement framework revealed that the Sixth Amendment
should apply to a consequence, an application of the Strickland test would
follow.183 Applying the Strickland test leads to the overlapping but distinct issues
of deficient performance and prejudice.184 It is in the application of this standard
that the balance of Padilla’s reality-based analysis appears: can counsel realistically provide advice as to the consequence? Although the significant entanglement
framework addresses only the applicability of the right, it is logical that where
significant entanglements exist, Strickland will be satisfied in some instances.185
Finally, Padilla’s conclusion that application of Strickland’s protections to such a
consequence will benefit all of the actors in the system186 applies equally to the
significant entanglement framework.
One reaction to the Padilla decision was that it would create undue burdens on
defense counsel. While other scholarship has been devoted to this issue,187 two

182. See Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1479–80 (explaining the history of deportable offenses, including the
now-obsolete procedure that a judge had discretion to recommend that an alien not be deported).
183. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (establishing the two-pronged test for ineffective
assistance of counsel).
184. See id. (determining that ineffective assistance of counsel exists where there has been deficient
performance and that performance prejudiced the defendant).
185. As with all factually intensive inquiries, there are alternative scenarios. For example, if Mr. Padilla had
received notice from the immigration authorities before he entered his plea that the crime for which he had been
charged, if convicted, would lead to his deportation, then it is unlikely that Mr. Padilla would have been able to
satisfy the prejudice prong of Strickland, even if his counsel had said nothing regarding deportation. In fact,
immigration authorities issued a notice before Mr. Padilla’s plea that he was being investigated regarding the
lawfulness of his entry, apparently in error because Mr. Padilla was a lawful permanent resident. Brief for
Petitioner at 11–12, Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1477 (No. 08-651). But this notice did not mention the deportation
consequences of the pending charges. Id.
186. See Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1486 (“[I]nformed consideration of possible deportation can only benefit both
the State and noncitizen defendants . . . .”).
187. See, e.g., McGregor Smyth, From “Collateral” to “Integral”: The Seismic Evolution of Padilla v.
Kentucky and Its Impact on Penalties Beyond Deportation, 54 HOW. L.J. 795 (2011) (suggesting that Padilla will
create manageable burdens); Derek Wikstrom, No Logical Stopping Point: The Consequences of Padilla v.
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observations may illuminate how the significant entanglement framework is
unlikely to exacerbate any such burden. First, the Strickland prejudice standard is a
high one.188 As in other areas of case law regarding effectiveness of counsel, it is
likely that the subset of behavior found to be ineffective is quite small. Second,
defense counsel is only as effective as the resources available, and defense counsel
will soon have available a significant resource in the form of a searchable database
of civil consequences of conviction.189 This resource will markedly lighten the
burden of advising a client regarding possible consequences.
In sum, the significant entanglement framework allows courts to evaluate the
protections that apply to the civil consequences of criminal convictions. This
framework begins with the premise that each consequence must be evaluated on its
own terms, and delineates two key areas of inquiry: the significance of the
consequence to the defendant and the entanglement of the civil consequence with
the criminal law. If the consequence is a significant entanglement, then the Sixth
Amendment applies.

Fn188

Fn189

IV. APPLYING THE SIGNIFICANT ENTANGLEMENT FRAMEWORK
A. Sixth Amendment Protection for Consequences of a
Guilty Plea Other Than Deportation
The most straightforward application of the significant entanglement framework
is to consider when Sixth Amendment protections apply to civil consequences of a
guilty plea other than deportation.190 The extension of the framework to different
consequences, but under the same constitutional right at the same “critical stage”
of the proceeding as applied in Padilla, helps to understand the framework. While
the lesson of Padilla and Turner is that each consequence must be evaluated
individually, this application reveals several categories of consequences that are
likely to warrant Sixth Amendment protections because their fundamental characteristics tend to satisfy the significant entanglement test. The types of civil
consequences that are more likely to warrant protection include additional imprisonment beyond the particular criminal sentence, other serious deprivations of
liberty, and perhaps significant financial penalties such as the deprivation of a
pension. Rather than resolve which of the many civil consequences of criminal
convictions are entitled to Sixth Amendment protection, the discussion below is
intended to illustrate the application of the significant entanglement framework

Kentucky’s Inevitable Expansion, 106 NW. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2012) (arguing that Padilla may overburden
the defense system).
188. See Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1485 (“Surmounting Strickland’s high bar is never an easy task”).
189. See AM. BAR ASS’N, COLLATERAL SANCTIONS, supra note 41.
190. See Gabriel J. Chin & Richard W. Holmes, Jr., Effective Assistance of Counsel and the Consequences of
Guilty Pleas, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 697, 738 (2002) (describing categories of consequences).
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and its usefulness for deciding whether a consequence as presented by the facts of
a particular case would be entitled to Sixth Amendment protection.
1. Additional Imprisonment
One category of civil consequences of criminal convictions is additional
imprisonment, imposed on the defendant by civil statute in addition to the
incarceration imposed by a criminal sentence. This situation arises in different
contexts including civil commitment, the use of the plea to impose a different
criminal sentence than that charged, and revocation of parole. Considering each of
these examples is helpful to understand how the significant entanglement framework operates.
Civil commitment—whether for mental health reasons or under a state’s
sexually violent predator laws—is a civil consequence of a criminal conviction
that leads to additional detention.191 When an individual is civilly committed, she
is supposed to be confined to a corrections facility with the capacity for mental
health treatment.192 Although the individual is in prison, any detention past the
duration of the criminal sentence occurs under operation of a civil statute. Before
Padilla, courts agreed that this additional incarceration was a collateral consequence of conviction and thus not subject to Sixth Amendment protection.193
However, the significant entanglement framework suggests that at least some
instances of civil commitment may warrant Sixth Amendment protection.
Looking at the first prong, significance of the consequence, civil commitment
seems to meet the test. First, incarceration is a severe consequence, perhaps the
most severe deprivation of liberty.194 Second, it is likely that a defendant who has
served the sentence for his crime but nonetheless continues to be detained finds
this consequence to be significant to him. Certainly those defendants who are
bringing a Sixth Amendment challenge because their attorney did not advise them
of the consequence of commitment would agree that the additional incarceration is
significant. Lower courts considering counsel’s advice regarding civil commitment
after Padilla have reached the conclusion that “[l]ike deportation was for the

191. See, e.g., Marco T. Torres, Direct and Collateral Consequences After Padilla v. Kentucky, 22 S.C. LAW. 16
(2011) (discussing civil commitment in the context of South Carolina’s Sexually Violent Predator Act).
192. See, e.g., CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 6604 (West 2010) (stating that a person civilly committed as a
sexually violent predator is to be held “for appropriate treatment and confinement in a secure facility designated
by the Director of Mental Health. The facility shall be located on the grounds of an institution under the
jurisdiction of the Department of Corrections.”).
193. See, e.g., Steele v. Murphy, 365 F.3d 14 (1st Cir. 2004) (finding civil commitment to be a collateral
consequence and thus not warranting protection).
194. See Turner v. Rogers, 131 S. Ct. 2507, 2518 (2011) (“The interest in securing that freedom, the freedom
from bodily restraint lies at the core of the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause. And we have made clear
that its threatened loss through legal proceedings demands due process protection) (internal citations and
quotations omitted).
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defendant in Padilla, this is a matter of great importance to defendant.”195 Some
courts, such as the Eleventh Circuit in United States v. Bauder, have applied
Padilla to find that affirmative misadvice regarding civil commitment constituted a
valid Sixth Amendment claim.196
As to the second prong, the entanglement of the civil consequence with the
criminal process, the analysis will vary according to the particular commitment
statute. If a statute operates such that the sentencing court essentially controls the
outcome of the defendant’s commitment, then this would be sufficiently entangled
to warrant Sixth Amendment protection. Indeed, such a defendant would face a
more entangled process than the defendant in Padilla.197 However, in many states,
commitment requires a separate hearing.198 If this hearing is simply implementing
a near-automatic outcome, like in Padilla, then the entanglement prong is met.
However, some civil commitment statutes provide for a distinct government
burden at this hearing.199 In this situation, the separate civil process means that
there is not a sufficient entanglement to warrant Sixth Amendment protections at
the guilty plea stage of the criminal process. Lower courts after Padilla have
reached this conclusion, focusing on the issue of entanglement. For example, three
federal district court cases since Padilla have found that the individualized
assessment provided by the relevant commitment statute differentiated the present
case from Padilla and Sixth Amendment protection was not warranted.200 In an
Iowa case, Blaise v. State, the court examined the process provided by the state

195. People v. Hughes, 953 N.E.2d 1017, 1024 (Ill. App. Ct. 2011).
196. See 619 F.3d 1272 (11th Cir. 2010); see also State v. Maldon, 29 A.3d 745 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2011)
(finding that defendant presented prima facie ineffective assistance of counsel claim where counsel incorrectly
advised defendant that he would not be subject to civil commitment as a result of his plea).
197. See Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1478–80 (discussing the limited civil process that would
implement Padilla’s near-automatic deportation).
198. See, e.g., IOWA CODE § 229A (outlining the separate review, petition, evaluation and hearing process for
commitment).
199. Id.
200. See United States v. Francis, No. 5:04-CR-74-KS, 2010 WL 6428639, at *5–6 (E.D. Ky. Dec. 30, 2010)
(applying direct/collateral distinction to due process claim and finding that failure to advise of civil commitment
consequence of plea is not violation of Due Process Clause because federal civil commitment statute provides
discretionarily initiated separate proceeding rather than automatic consequence, and also holding that ineffective
assistance of counsel claim fails because no evidence of misadvice or failure to advise); Maxwell v. Larkins, No.
4:08 CV 1896 DDN, 2010 WL 2680333, at *9–10 (E.D. Mo. July 1, 2010) (declining to extend Padilla to failure
of plea counsel to advise the defendant of the requirement to register as a sex offender, the requirement to
complete the Missouri sex offender program (“MOSOP”) prior to release, and possible commitment under the
state’s sexually violent predator (“SVP”) law, because none of these requirements are mentioned in the National
Legal Aid and Defender Association guidelines, sex offender registration is only civil and regulatory in nature and
not punitive, the MOSOP program does not resemble deportation because it is a requirement while in prison to
complete parole, and SVP commitment is not an automatic result); Brown v. Goodwin, No. 09-211, 2010 WL
1930574, at *13 (D.N.J. May 11, 2010) (stating in dicta that failure to advise defendant of consequence of civil
commitment as a result of plea cannot be ineffective under Padilla because civil commitment is not automatic like
deportation because state commitment statute requires individualized assessment); see also Hughes, 953 N.E.2d
1017(denying Sixth Amendment claim where, inter alia, defendant made no effort to show that civil commitment
was “presumptively mandatory”).
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civil commitment statute, which included notice and a trial, to conclude that the
defendant did not have a Sixth Amendment claim.201
A related example of additional imprisonment is where parole or probation is at
issue. In this circumstance, the defendant’s plea has some effect on parole
eligibility or revocation, thereby extending the defendant’s incarceration beyond
the sentence associated with the plea. This example straddles the civil-criminal or
direct-collateral divide in that parole and probation are not strictly part of a
criminal sentence, but nonetheless are not purely civil in nature or in legal
grounding. As with civil commitment, additional incarceration is a significant
consequence. Further, whether additional process is provided is integral to the
entanglement analysis. The Missouri Supreme Court has found that misadvice
regarding parole eligibility can constitute ineffective assistance of counsel.202 In
that case, Webb v. State, there was no additional process available to the defendant
and, as with deportation in Padilla, the criminal plea hearing was the only process
afforded the defendant.203 Thus, the entanglement prong was also satisfied. This,
however, may be an unusual factual circumstance.
Frequently, a separate hearing is held regarding the revocation of probation or
parole. In such a situation, it is likely that the entanglement prong would not be
met, and thus Sixth Amendment protections would not apply to the plea hearing.
Yet the separate hearing would then be subject to the due process analysis that was
applied in Turner, which relied on the key precedent of Gagnon v. Scarpelli.204 In
Gagnon, the Court concluded that there is no right to counsel at a probation
revocation hearing.205 And the Turner decision used Gagnon to justify its ultimate
conclusion that procedural protections other than counsel were sufficient.206 An
interesting twist is that, despite Gagnon, the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
and corresponding state rules require counsel at each stage of a probation

201. Blaise v. State, 801 N.W.2d 627 (Iowa Ct. App. 2011) (noting that commitment as a sexually violent
predator under IOWA CODE § 229A requires a review committee that “has determined that the person meets the
definition of a sexually violent predator,” a petition by the Attorney General, a preliminary determination by the
district court as to probable cause, an evaluation, and a jury or bench trial to determine whether the State proved
beyond a reasonable doubt that the respondent is a sexually violent predator).
202. Webb v. State, 334 S.W.3d 126 (Mo. 2011) (finding that misadvice from counsel regarding parole
eligibility for plea was sufficient for prima facie ineffective assistance claim and remanding for evidentiary
hearing). Note, however, that Webb is explicitly a misadvice case, with a concurrence urging a holding that
affirmative advice is required, and a dissent stating that parole is clearly collateral, and thus Padilla is
inapplicable. See id.; accord Frost v. State, 76 So.3d 862 (Ala. Crim. App. 2011) (holding that defendant presented
a valid claim for ineffective assistance of counsel where counsel failed to advise defendant that plea would result
in ineligibility for parole under sex offender law).
203. Webb, 344 S.W.3d 126.
204. See Turner v. Rogers, 131 S. Ct. 2507, 2518–19 (2011) (citing Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 789–90
(1973)); see also supra note 141 (discussing Turner’s reliance on Gagnon).
205. Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973).
206. Turner, 131 S. Ct. at 2520.
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revocation hearing.207 Thus, although the Supreme Court has not decided to
explicitly provide a right to counsel in revocation proceedings, it functionally
exists, and a defendant in a separate revocation proceeding would enjoy this
protection under the current rules.
A final example of additional incarceration is where a plea may be used to
enhance or otherwise determine a sentence in a separate proceeding.208 This
example is in fact a criminal consequence of a criminal conviction. But it
nonetheless makes the point that Padilla’s rejection of the direct-collateral
distinction requires individualized consideration of each consequence to understand when the Sixth Amendment applies. In the instance of one plea being used to
enhance another sentence, before Padilla, courts rejected the view that the Sixth
Amendment requires the advice of counsel.209 Using the significant entanglement
analysis, again the consequence of incarceration is significant, but the issue of
entanglement is more complex. In this circumstance, because the consequence is a
criminal one, there is a right to counsel that attaches in the secondary proceeding.
However, it is also the case that the consequence itself is virtually automatic. To
illustrate, if a defendant pleads guilty to crime A while he has been charged but not
yet convicted of crime B, then once the defendant is convicted of crime B, there is
no discretion as to the effect of the plea to crime A on the sentence for crime B.
That is to say, no amount of advice of counsel or other process associated with
crime B allows defendant to avoid the consequence of the plea to crime A. Thus,
although it is not an entanglement of a civil consequence in the criminal process,
the consequence of that initial plea is nonetheless entangled in the initial criminal
process; that is, the initial court essentially controls the outcome in the second
court. This entanglement suggests the Sixth Amendment should apply to the
consequence as it arises in the initial criminal case. Courts after Padilla appear to
be divided on this issue. At least two lower courts have rejected Sixth Amendment
claims where the defendant was not advised that the plea could be used in a parallel
criminal proceeding.210 However, the Eleventh Circuit seemed to accept that such

207. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 32.1 (a)(3) (stating that at the initial appearance, “the judge must inform the person
of . . . the person’s right to retain counsel or to request that counsel be appointed if the person cannot obtain
counsel.”); id. at 32.1 (b)(1) (stating that at the preliminary hearing, “the judge must give the person: notice of . . .
the person’s right to retain counsel or to request that counsel be appointed if the person cannot obtain counsel.”);
id. at 32.1 (b)(2) (stating that at the revocation hearing, “the person is entitled to: . . . notice of the person’s right to
retain counsel or to request that counsel be appointed if the person cannot obtain counsel.”).
208. See generally JAMES FRANK ET AL., COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF CRIMINAL CONVICTION IN OHIO (2011)
(considering enhancement of subsequent sentence as a collateral consequence of conviction).
209. See, e.g., Ex parte Morrow, 952 S.W.2d 530, 535 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997) (finding no Sixth Amendment
ineffective assistance of counsel where a plea to noncapital offense became an aggravating factor in a capital case
(citing King v. Dutton, 17 F.3d 151, 154 (6th Cir. 1994))).
210. See State v. Rasheed, 340 S.W.3d 280 (Mo. Ct. App. 2011) (declining to extend Padilla to use of plea in
subsequent prosecution because “[t]he use of a federal-court guilty plea in a separate state proceeding is less a
‘practically inevitable’ consequence of that plea, than a rare result of concurrent federal and state prosecutions”);
People v. Pierre, 913 N.Y.S.2d 655 (N.Y. App. Div. 2011) (rejecting a defendant’s claim, post-Padilla—but
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an ineffective assistance of counsel claim was possible though it rejected the claim
at issue based on insufficient evidence that counsel failed to advise the defendant
of the implications of a state court plea on a federal court sentencing.211
In sum, those civil consequences of conviction that involve additional incarceration but no additional process are generally likely to satisfy the significant
entanglement framework. Thus, this category of consequences, following the logic
of Padilla and Turner, should be afforded Sixth Amendment protection at the plea
stage.

Fn211

2. Other Deprivations of Liberty
There are other civil consequences of criminal convictions that are deprivations
of liberty, but do not involve additional incarceration. Examining these consequences helps to understand the significant entanglement test, and particularly the
issue of significance. The classic example of this type of consequence is sex
offender registries. A sex offender registry is plainly civil—stemming from a civil
statute and involving civil law—but also necessarily flows from a criminal
conviction. Courts before Padilla split on how the Sixth Amendment should be
applied to these consequences.212
Applying the significant entanglements framework, the significance prong
considers the perspective that being listed on a public registry—essentially a
public shaming that often translates into a community restricting one’s presence or
activities—is a harsh consequence.213 However, this factor is more complex than it
is in the incarceration context because of the factual variation in the ways a registry
can affect a defendant’s life after release. For example, some counties or municipalities have laws requiring registration and also prohibiting registered sex
offenders from living in certain areas.214 One individual living in a densely
populated area or an area with a proportionally high number of individuals with
criminal records may not be confronted on a regular basis with his presence on a
registry, whereas a defendant living in a less populated area with a low proportion

without reference to it—that his guilty plea was rendered invalid because the trial court failed to advise him that
his state conviction could be used to enhance a sentence on a pending federal criminal matter).
211. See United States v. Mata, 400 Fed. App’x 422 (11th Cir. 2010) (finding no ineffective assistance of
counsel because there was no misadvice or evidence of prejudice regarding effect of state court plea on
subsequent federal court sentencing).
212. Compare State v. Edwards, 157 P.3d 56, 64–65 (N.M. Ct. App. 2007) (“In light of the harsh and virtually
certain consequences under [the New Mexico Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA)] that
flow from a plea of guilty or no contest to a sex offense, we . . . conclude that defense counsel has an affirmative
duty to advise a defendant charged with a sex offense that a plea of guilty or no contest will almost certainly
subject the defendant to the registration requirements of SORNA.”), with Torres, supra note 192 (discussing
South Carolina sex offender registry precedent that no advice is required).
213. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, NO EASY ANSWERS, SEX OFFENDER REGISTRATION LAWS IN THE U.S. 3 (2007),
http://www.hrw.org/fr/node/10685/section/2.
214. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS § 28.734 (2006) (prohibiting registered sex offenders from working,
loitering, or residing within certain areas).
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of individuals with criminal records may suffer harassment and isolation as a result
of the registry.215 Thus, there may be some variation as to the importance to a
defendant of this consequence. However, the consequence of sex offender registries is at least plausibly one that meets the significance prong.216
For sex offender registries, the issue of entanglement may be more straightforward. Traditionally, the state statutes that require sex offender registration do not
provide any additional process or discretion as to the requirement.217 In fact, once
a defendant has pled to a qualifying crime, the registration requirement is
automatically part of the requirements of release from incarceration.218 This
particular civil consequence is entangled with the criminal process as much as, if
not more than, deportation.
The few courts that have considered the civil consequence of sex offender
registration after Padilla have split on whether Sixth Amendment protections are
appropriate. At least three cases have found valid ineffective assistance of counsel
claims under the Sixth Amendment where counsel failed to advise a defendant that
a plea would require the defendant to register as a sex offender.219 One of these
courts specifically noted “the unique and mandatory nature of the specific
consequence of the sex offender registration requirement.”220 However, other
courts have found that there is no Sixth Amendment protection for the consequence of a sex offender registry because “sex offender registration is not punitive
in that it is only civil and regulatory in nature.”221 Thus, sex offender registries

215. See MARCUS NIETO & DAVID JUNG, THE IMPACT OF RESIDENCY RESTRICTIONS ON SEX OFFENDERS AND
CORRECTIONAL MANAGEMENT PRACTICES: A LITERATURE REVIEW (2006), http://www.library.ca.gov/crb/06/08/06008.pdf. This hypothetical contrast in experience raises the question of whether an individual listed on a registry
has his liberty constrained by being effectively forced to live in more populated areas with high rates of
individuals with criminal records.
216. See Joanna Woolman, Padilla’s “Truly Clear” Test: A Case for a Broader Application in Minnesota, 37
WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 840 (2011) (arguing that in Minnesota, three categories of consequences should be
included in counsel’s post-Padilla duty due to their harshness: custody restrictions, Department of Health and
Human Services licensing, and sex offender registry requirements).
217. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 290(a)(2)(A)–(E) (2010) (requiring mandatory, lifelong registration for
persons convicted of enumerated offenses and discretion for court to order registration for other offenses).
218. See id.
219. See United States v. Rose, ACM 36508, 2010 WL 4068976, at *10 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. June 11, 2010)
(finding ineffective assistance of counsel where counsel failed to advise defendant of the plea consequence of
having to register as a sex offender, and noting military precedent of United States v. Miller, 63 M.J. 452, 458
(C.A.A.F. 2006) (establishing prospective requirement of advising defendants of sex offender registry consequence of plea)); Taylor v. State, 698 S.E.2d 384 (Ga. Ct. App. 2010) (applying Padilla factors and concluding
that “the failure to advise a client that pleading guilty will require him to register as a sex offender is
constitutionally deficient performance”); People v. Fonville, 804 N.W.2d 878, 892 (Mich. Ct. App. 2011) (relying
on Padilla for “the logic of its rationale” and finding failure to advise of sex offender registry consequence of plea
is ineffective assistance because it is a severe penalty, automatically applied, and intimately related to the criminal
process); Calvert v. State, 342 S.W.3d 477 (Tenn. 2011) (holding that counsel’s failure to advise of mandatory
lifetime community supervision consequence of plea to sex offense was ineffective assistance of counsel).
220. See Fonville, 804 N.W.2d at 892.
221. See Maxwell v. Larkins, No. 4:08 CV 1896 DDN, 2010 WL 2680333, at *9–10 (E.D. Mo. July 1, 2010)
(declining to extend Padilla to failure of plea counsel to advise the defendant of the requirement to register as a
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may be an example where the application of the significant entanglement framework varies with the factual variation of each case. Nonetheless, in its classic
variation, this consequence meets the significant entanglement framework and
thus warrants Sixth Amendment protection.
3. Financial Loss
A final category of civil consequences of criminal convictions that is useful to
help understand the significant entanglement framework is financial loss. Certainly
a number of civil consequences of criminal conviction can fall in this category, but
two are useful for explanatory purposes. The first is loss of licensing or access to a
job, and the second is forfeiture of assets as a civil penalty subsequent to
conviction.
The issue of licensing or job qualifications is likely to be a fact-intensive
analysis, as this consequence can be implemented in several ways. Informal,
employer-specific exclusions from employment, which are not addressed here,
have generated their own reform efforts and commentary.222 As for exclusion from
jobs or professional licensing due to legal requirements, there are two general
categories: The first is particular employers—such as law enforcement—that due
to the nature of their business, but not based on licensing, exclude potential
employees with criminal convictions.223 The second is state or federal statutes or
regulations that exclude those with criminal convictions from state licensing for
certain professions.224
Where there is no formal licensing statute but there is a formal exclusion from
employment, the significant entanglement analysis may not be met. As to the
significance of the consequence, deprivation of one’s chosen profession seems
harsh, but the restriction from a particular employer is a narrow penalty. Thus,
significance of the consequence may turn on the context of a particular case and
defendant, but as a general matter would not meet the significance prong. Further,
this consequence is likely to be automatic, as it is unlikely that employers would
want any discretion to, for example, hire those with criminal records as police

sex offender or the possibility of civil commitment); see also Robinson v. State, No. A11-550, 2012 WL 118259,
at *4 (Minn. Ct. App. Jan. 17, 2012) (noting that Padilla does not clearly state that the direct-collateral distinction
should not be applied outside of deportation, and finding that counsel’s failure to advise regarding lifetime sex
offender registry requirement was not deficient).
222. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 10-142 (2010) (banning employers from asking on initial job applications
for criminal history); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 151B, § 4 (9 1⁄2) (2010) (same); MINN. STAT. § 364.021 (2009) (same);
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 28-2-3(B) (2010) (same); see also AMY L. SOLOMON ET AL., URBAN INST., FROM PRISON TO
WORK: THE EMPLOYMENT DIMENSIONS OF PRISONER REENTRY 13 (2004), http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/
411097_From_Prison_to_Work.pdf; RODRIGUEZ & ENSELLEM, supra note 61.
223. See, e.g., MD. CODE REGS. 12.10.01.17(A) (2006) (prohibiting hiring of individuals convicted of certain
felonies or misdemeanors as correctional officers).
224. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., EDUC. § 6-113(1)–(3) (2004) (prohibiting licensing or hiring of school
employees convicted of sex crimes or crimes of violence); MD. CODE REGS 10.09.54.06(B)(6) (2006) (prohibiting
licensing of personal care aides convicted of felony).
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officers. The one court that has addressed such a scenario declined, albeit with
limited analysis, to afford Sixth Amendment protection in this context.225
In the case of a state licensing statute that categorically excludes individuals
with convictions from certain types of employment, the significant entanglements
framework is more likely to be met because of the significance of being banned
from an entire industry and the potentially automatic nature of the consequence.
For example, some states exclude individuals with criminal convictions from
working in child care facilities, without any process regarding the application of
the exclusion.226 This ban, an exclusion from a broad range of employment and
thus significant, would also be entangled in the criminal process because of the
lack of process provided. Although some have advocated for affording Sixth
Amendment protections to the consequence of licensing requirements, there has
not been an opinion after Padilla addressing the issue.227
Another civil consequence that involves financial deprivation is the forfeiture of
property. It is necessary to draw a preliminary distinction: criminal statutes allow
forfeiture of property as part of a criminal sentence, but that is a separate issue
from a civil forfeiture triggered by the fact of a criminal conviction. For example,
federal statute authorizes a court—as part of the criminal sentence for offenses
such as drug trafficking—to order the forfeiture of property involved in the
offense.228 In this situation, the forfeiture is part of the sentence and plainly within
the ambit of the Sixth Amendment.229 However, there can also be forfeiture due to
a separate civil statute that requires the forfeiture of property because of a
conviction. In this situation, the significant entanglement framework helps to
analyze the protections that should apply.
Applying the significant entanglements analysis, some types of civil forfeiture
may well require effective assistance of counsel after Padilla. First, the significance of the penalty will be a fact-intensive inquiry, but there are certainly
situations where the forfeiture of assets would be a particularly severe penalty.
Second, the issue of entanglement is also potentially satisfied if the civil forfeiture
does not involve any additional process and is automatically triggered by the fact
of conviction.
A recent case, Commonwealth v. Abraham,230 involves a factual scenario that
seems to satisfy the significant entanglement framework. While the Abraham case

225. See Thomas v. United States, No. RWT-10-2274, 2011 WL 1457917, at *4–5 (D. Md. Apr. 15, 2011)
(declining to extend Padilla to the consequence of ineligibility for employment with a public safety agency due to
plea to illegally carrying a weapon on national park property).
226. See, e.g., W. Todd Miller, The Central Registry Statute for Abuse and Neglect Matters Is Constitutionally
Flawed, 8 RUTGERS J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 651 (2011) (discussing New Jersey’s categorical licensing exclusions).
227. See Woolman, supra note 217.
228. See 18 U.S.C. § 982 (2006) (authorizing a court to impose as part of a sentence the forfeiture of property
“involved in such offense, or any property traceable to such offense”).
229. See infra notes 177–78 and accompanying text.
230. 996 A.2d 1090 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2010).
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is pending on appeal to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court,231 the intermediate
appellate decision is helpful to understand the application of the significant
entanglement framework to financial consequences of a criminal conviction. Mr.
Abraham, a teacher, pled guilty to indecent assault, a charge that triggered the
automatic loss of his pension under the Public Employee Pension Forfeiture
Act.232 Mr. Abraham brought a Sixth Amendment claim, alleging that his counsel
was deficient for failing to inform him of this consequence.233 In considering the
defendant’s Sixth Amendment claim, the court recognized that “Padilla harkens
back to the original Strickland concept, adopted by our Supreme Court in Pierce,
of examining the totality of the circumstances to determine what advice must be
given to have a fully informed guilty plea.”234
Embracing a fact-intensive inquiry, the court concluded that counsel’s failure to
advise defendant that his plea would result in the loss of his pension was
ineffective.235 In reaching this conclusion, the court relied on the observations that
the loss was automatic, only criminal behavior triggered the consequence, and the
consequence was of a punitive nature.236 Essentially, the court in Abraham applied
the significant entanglement framework: it examined the significance to the
defendant and the entanglement of the civil consequence with the criminal process
to conclude that the Sixth Amendment applied.237 Thus, the forfeiture of a pension
warranted Sixth Amendment protection because it satisfied the significant entanglement framework.

Fn231

Fn232
Fn233

Fn234

Fn235

Fn236

Fn237

4. Other Consequences
As the significant entanglement framework is fact-specific, it is impossible to
address in a single article how the framework would apply to each of the thousands
of civil consequences of conviction.238 However, there are some general characteristics of consequences that predict the application of the framework.
First, the significance prong is unlikely to be met by consequences that are
financial in nature, and represent a reduction in the financial options available to a
defendant but not a comprehensive deprivation of financial opportunity. The

231. See Commonwealth v. Abraham, 9 A.3d 1133 (Pa. 2010) (granting petition for appeal).
232. See Abraham, 996 A.2d at 1091.
233. Id. at 1092.
234. Id.; see Margaret Colgate Love, Collateral Consequences After Padilla v. Kentucky: From Punishment to
Regulation, 30 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. (forthcoming 2011) (discussing Abraham’s embrace of a fact-intensive
inquiry).
235. See Abraham, 996 A.2d at 1092–95.
236. See id.
237. Outside the scope of this Article, but interesting for broader considerations of the distinction between civil
and criminal law, is the court’s analysis of whether the consequence of forfeiture is “civil” or “penal” under
Pennsylvania law. See id. at 1094. Although this analysis has fluidity with the entanglement prong presented in
this Article, it involves a separate line of state cases, with their origin in the Ex Post Facto Clause, that reveal
fluidity in the line between civil law and criminal law.
238. See AM. BAR ASS’N, COLLATERAL SANCTIONS, supra note 41.
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example discussed above regarding exclusion from a particular employer falls in
this category: while exclusion from work has a financial impact, exclusion from a
particular employer is narrow enough that it is unlikely to be objectively significant. Other consequences that may fall in this category are certain government
benefits, prohibitions on financial trading, or licensing restrictions.
Second, the entanglement prong is unlikely to be met by non-automatic
consequences that involve separate processes. Although there is a separate analysis
to be done regarding the constitutional sufficiency of any civil process used to
impose a civil consequence of conviction, the framework operates to exclude such
consequences from protection during the criminal process. This is consistent with
the underlying sources of protection for the significant entanglement framework: if
the criminal court controls the outcome of a consequence, then protections should
be provided in that court, but if a separate civil process controls the outcome, then
the protections are properly provided in that process. Those civil commitment
statutes, discussed above, that provide a separate civil process would fall in this
category of consequences that do not meet the significant entanglement framework. Other consequences that similarly would not meet the framework are
government benefits for which a civil process is provided, licensing restrictions
with an appeal process, or gun ownership restrictions with a corresponding civil
process.
B. Transferring the Significant Entanglement Framework to
Civil Consequences of Conviction in Other Contexts
Although the significant entanglement framework emerges from Padilla, a case
considering Sixth Amendment protection for a consequence of a guilty plea, the
framework is not necessarily specific to either the Sixth Amendment or the plea
stage, as is illustrated by the parallel logic applied in Turner. The framework is a
gatekeeping mechanism that considers whether a particular consequence should be
afforded protection at a particular stage in the criminal process, thus it is
potentially useful in broader contexts. The previous discussion addressed how the
significant entanglement framework can be used to determine whether Sixth
Amendment protections apply to civil consequences of a guilty plea other than
deportation. The next logical step in this inquiry is how the significant entanglement test applies to Sixth Amendment protections at critical stages in the criminal
process other than a guilty plea. And the step beyond that is the application of the
significant entanglement framework beyond the Sixth Amendment. To understand
the applicability of the significant entanglement framework to these broader
contexts, this Section will consider a few examples. As before, these examples are
meant to illustrate the applicability of the framework as a mode of analysis, but by
definition the resolution of whether any particular consequence is afforded
protection—and whether a successful claim has been presented—must be resolved
based on the specific facts of the case.

2012]

SIGNIFICANT ENTANGLEMENTS

1429

1. Right to Counsel at Other Critical Stages
The Padilla decision concerned the right to effective counsel at the guilty plea
stage and was premised on precedent that the plea is a “critical stage” of the
criminal process.239 Thus, an extension of this logic suggests that the significant
entanglements framework might apply to civil consequences at other critical
stages of the criminal process.240 Not every critical stage presents circumstances
that involve civil consequences, so this inquiry is a limited one.
One critical stage where civil consequences are implicated is sentencing. The
Supreme Court has made clear that the act of sentencing—regardless of how or
when it appears in the criminal process—is a critical stage for purposes of the
Sixth Amendment. In Mempa v. Rhay, the Court recognized the Sixth Amendment
right to counsel at sentencing, and held that the imposition of a sentence at a parole
revocation hearing was a “critical stage” for the purposes of the Sixth Amendment.241 The Court noted that the imposition of a sentence triggers this right,
“whether it be labeled a revocation of probation or a deferred sentencing.”242
At sentencing, a defendant faces exposure to civil consequences that is analogous to that at the plea stage. As with a guilty plea, counsel’s obligation clearly
extends to advice about the sentence itself.243 Just as the charge to which a
defendant pleads may implicate different civil consequences, the sentence a
defendant receives may also implicate a variety of civil consequences. For
example, some immigration consequences are triggered by sentences of one year
or more.244 So, the assistance of counsel in advocating for a sentence of a lesser
length, or in a situation with multiple crimes, for multiple shorter sentences, would
be central to potential civil consequences. In this example, Padilla tells us that the
civil consequence of deportation is a significant one because of its severity.245
Padilla also tells us that its nearly automatic operation makes it a consequence that

239. See Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1487 (2010); see also Brief for Law Professors as Amici Curiae,
supra note 87, at 7 (discussing protection at critical stage in context of argument that Sixth Amendment does not
carve out collateral consequences at plea stage).
240. See, e.g., Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 689–90 (1972) (holding that the right to counsel attaches at
initiation of formal judicial proceedings); Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 9–10 (1970) (finding that a
preliminary hearing is critical stage in criminal proceeding); United States v Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 236–37 (1967)
(finding right to counsel at pretrial lineup because it is a critical stage of the prosecution); White v. Maryland, 373
U.S. 59, 60 (1963) (same); Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52, 53 (1961) (finding that arraignment is critical stage
in criminal proceeding); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 57 (1932) (holding that the right to attorney attaches at
the time of arraignment).
241. 389 U.S. 128, 136 (1967).
242. Id. at 137.
243. See id. at 136.
244. See 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) (2006 & Supp. 2009) (stating that a defendant is deportable if convicted
of an aggravated felony); 8 U.S.C.A. § 1101(a)(43) (2011) (defining aggravated felony as various crimes for
which the defendant receives a sentence of at least one year).
245. See Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1481 (“We have long recognized that deportation is a
particularly severe penalty.”) (internal quotation omitted).
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is entangled in the criminal process.246 The significant entanglement framework
then suggests that the Sixth Amendment should apply to advice regarding civil
consequences of sentencing just as it does to such advice regarding a plea. This
analysis and the preceding discussion regarding consequences beyond deportation
suggest that applying the significant entanglement framework to other consequences at sentencing may yield a similar conclusion.247 Although this reasoning
facially suggests yet another expansion of obligations for defense counsel, the
reality is that only a small subset of civil consequences are tied to sentence rather
than conviction. Thus, the same information sources that will enable counsel to
advise at the plea stage are likely to be sufficient as to advice at the sentencing
stage.

Fn246

Fn247

2. Significant Entanglements Outside the Sixth Amendment
As discussed above, the direct-collateral distinction eschewed by Padilla has its
roots in both Sixth Amendment and due process jurisprudence. Thus, if the
significant entanglement framework is useful for considering civil consequences
of conviction in the Sixth Amendment context, it may be useful in the due process
context as well. An illustrative example is due process protections for the guilty
plea stage of the criminal process. Padilla relies on the precedent that the guilty
plea stage is sufficiently critical to warrant Sixth Amendment protections.248 But
due process protections also apply to this critical stage.249
It is well-established that due process protections require courts to ensure that a
guilty plea is knowing and voluntary.250 Before Padilla, courts had held that a
knowing and voluntary plea includes an awareness of the direct consequences of
conviction but does not need to include awareness of the collateral civil consequences of conviction.251 Like the cases preceding Padilla concerning Sixth
Amendment protections, this conclusion was based on the direct-collateral distinc-

246. See id. at 1480 (discussing the near-automatic result of deportation).
247. See Sweeney, supra note 100, at 359–60 (“Sentencing is another area that provides ample opportunities
for constructive lawyering on behalf of a noncitizen client, especially where certain sentences (even if suspended)
can trigger the ‘aggravated felony’ category and its draconian consequences. For example, suppose that during a
plea negotiation on an assault charge the state insists on a three-year sentence. If the case involved an altercation
with a number of individuals who could be seen as victims, a creative defense attorney could satisfy the state’s
concerns and avoid the aggravated felony at the same time by proposing a plea deal that stacks three separate
charges of assault, each with a sentence of 364 days, to be served consecutively. Alternatively, counsel could
recommend that an offer for a longer, suspended sentence be declined in favor of a shorter sentence of ‘real’ time
that the defendant will actually serve.”).
248. See Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1480–81 (citing McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 (1970)).
249. See Boykin v. Alabama, 295 U.S. 238, 243 (1969) (establishing requirement that guilty plea be knowing
and voluntary).
250. Id. at 244 n.5 (citing McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 466 (1969)).
251. See Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 755 (1970) (finding that a plea stands if “entered by one fully
aware of the direct consequences” unless induced by threats, misrepresentation, or improper promises (citing
Shelton v. United States, 246 F.2d 571, 572 n.2 (5th Cir. 1957) (en banc), rev’d, 356 U.S. 26 (1958))).
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tion.252 Thus, after Padilla, there is the question of whether the direct-collateral
distinction should still exist in the due process context when it no longer has a
place in a Sixth Amendment analysis. To answer this question, it is helpful to
reevaluate the due process protections at the plea stage, applying the logic of
Padilla, even though the holding in Padilla does not explicitly extend to due
process protections. Indeed, courts applying Padilla to due process claims regarding the plea stage have recognized this limitation, and declined to extend Padilla to
these claims.253 However, applying the significant entanglement framework to due
process claims at the plea stage reveals that there is both consistency and logic to
rejecting the direct-collateral distinction in this context.
This conclusion is, in part, tied to the history of Supreme Court jurisprudence
that shifted the basis for the right to counsel from due process to the Sixth
Amendment. Before Gideon v. Wainwright recognized the Sixth Amendment’s
right-to-counsel protections,254 the Court relied on special circumstances to invoke
the right to counsel in criminal proceedings, and these protections were grounded

252. See Bustos v. White, 521 F.3d 321, 325–26 (4th Cir. 2008) (considering precedent regarding court’s
obligation to inform defendant of consequences of plea when deciding whether it was ineffective assistance of
counsel to fail to advise client regarding parole eligibility); Steele v. Murphy, 365 F.3d 14, 17 (1st Cir. 2004)
(holding that the judge’s failure to inform petitioner before he pled guilty of possibility of civil commitment as
sexual offender did not violate due process, and thus plea was still valid); United States v. U.S. Currency in the
Amount of $228,536.00, 895 F.2d 908, 915 (2d Cir. 1990) (“Certain possible consequences of a guilty plea are
‘collateral’ rather than direct and need not be explained to the defendant in order to ensure that the plea is
voluntary.”); Holmes v. United States, 876 F.2d 1545, 1549 (11th Cir. 1989) (holding that “the requirements of
Rule 11 [of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure] do not encompass the court’s failure to inform a defendant
of his ineligibility for parole since parole eligibility is a collateral rather than a direct consequence of a guilty
plea.”); Hill v. Lockhart, 731 F.2d 568, 570 (8th Cir. 1984) (“The details of parole eligibility are considered
collateral rather than direct consequences of a plea, of which a defendant need not be informed before pleading
guilty.” (citations omitted)), aff’d, 474 U.S. 52 (1985); Armstrong v. Egeler, 563 F.2d 796, 800 (6th Cir. 1977)
(holding that due process does not require that a defendant be informed of his parole ineligibility before pleading
guilty); Trujillo v. United States, 377 F.2d 266, 268–69 (5th Cir. 1967) (holding that a defendant need not be
advised of his parole ineligibility before entering a guilty plea because “eligibility for parole is not a
‘consequence’ of a plea of guilty, but a matter of legislative grace” and thus “noneligibility for parole is not a
‘consequence’ of a plea of guilty” but rather “a consequence of the withholding of legislative grace”).
253. See United States v. Francis, No. 5:04-CR-74-KSF, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 142509, at *13–14 (E.D. Ky.
Dec. 30, 2010) (applying the direct/collateral distinction to a due process claim and finding that failure to advise
of civil commitment consequence of plea is not violation of due process because federal civil commitment statute
provides discretionarily initiated separate proceeding rather than automatic consequence); State v. Salazar, No. 2
CA-CR 2010-0296-PR, 2011 Ariz. App. LEXIS 279, at *4–5 (Ariz. Ct. App. Jan. 19, 2011) (declining to extend
Padilla to due process claim that trial court should have warned defendant of the immigration consequence of his
guilty plea); Smith v. State, 697 S.E.2d 177, 184 (Ga. 2010) (drawing distinction between Fifth Amendment due
process context—where the direct/collateral distinction is appropriate—and Sixth Amendment ineffective
assistance of counsel claim where the direct/collateral distinction is not appropriate); Clark v. State, 702 S.E.2d
657, 659 (Ga. Ct. App. 2010) (finding guilty plea was knowing and voluntary despite trial court’s failure to advise
defendant that a consequence of conviction would be a prohibition from living with his minor daughter because
defendant raised only a due process claim regarding the voluntariness of the plea, and not an ineffective assistance
of counsel claim, thus the direct/collateral consequence distinction applied).
254. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
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in due process.255 After Gideon, the context for these protections shifted to the
Sixth Amendment.256 Defendants often raise parallel due process claims—
regarding the court’s behavior—and Sixth Amendment claims—regarding counsel’s behavior—in the plea context.257 As the cases discussed in this Article reveal,
courts continue to conflate Sixth Amendment standards and due process standards
when it comes to the right to counsel in a criminal prosecution.258 This makes
sense; until Padilla, the analysis for each set of protections regarding civil
consequences of conviction was similar, with the key variation being whether it
was the court or counsel who was responsible for implementing the protection.
The historical overlap between these protections, the conflation by courts of due
process and Sixth Amendment claims, and the parallel nature of these claims under
modern case law all support the view that Padilla’s rejection of a direct-collateral
distinction for civil consequences should extend to due process protections for
guilty pleas.
If a basic premise of Padilla is that a specific factual examination of the civil
consequence and its place in the criminal process is necessary to understand the
scope of the Sixth Amendment protections afforded to it, then a similar examination should apply to due process protections. Indeed the justifications of Padilla
for its conclusion in the Sixth Amendment context translate almost identically to
the due process context. This translation is underscored by the Court’s willingness
in Turner to make a fact-specific inquiry, embracing the significant entanglement
criteria, in a consideration of due process protections in a civil proceeding.
In addition, a key premise of the Padilla decision was recognition of the reality
of plea bargains in the criminal process: the prevalence and importance of pleas for
actual defendants, as well as how defendants experience the plea process.259 That
same reality provides the context for due process protections at the plea stage.260

255. See Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52 (1961) (finding that failure to appoint counsel at arraignment
deprived defendant of due process); Moore v. Michigan, 355 U.S. 155 (1957) (finding denial of due process where
the defendant did not intelligently and understandingly waive counsel before entering a plea of guilty and no
counsel was present at hearing on the degree of the crime following entry of the guilty plea); Betts v. Brady, 316
U.S. 455, 461–62 (1942) (relying on “special circumstances” to make the right to counsel applicable as a due
process protection).
256. See Gideon, 372 U.S. 335 (overruling Betts and holding that the Sixth Amendment as applied through the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is applicable to the states and, accordingly, that there is an
absolute right to appointment of counsel in felony cases).
257. See, e.g., id.
258. See supra note 248.
259. See Brief of State Attorneys General as Amici Curiae Supporting Affirmance at *9, Padilla v. Kentucky,
130 S. Ct. 1473 (2010) (No. 08-651) (calling plea bargaining the “backbone of the criminal justice system”);
Bibas, supra note 174, at 1138 (discussing significance of Padilla and its focus on the reality of guilty pleas);
Gabriel J. Chin & Margaret Colgate Love, Status as Punishment: A Critical Guide to Padilla v. Kentucky, 25
CRIM. JUST. 21, 30 (2010) (discussing how prevalence of plea bargains is key factor in the context in which Padilla
came to be decided).
260. The importance of pleas to the criminal process has led to suggestions that due process suggests or
requires a stronger role for courts in that process. See Laura I. Appleman, The Plea Jury, 85 IND. L.J. 731 (2010)
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For example, Padilla recognized the role of counsel’s misrepresentation or
omission at the plea stage as inducing behavior.261 Misrepresentation or omission
of information by the court at the plea stage would similarly induce behavior by a
defendant.
Further, a key element of the analysis in Padilla was the legal community’s view
that counsel should provide advice regarding immigration consequences. Before
Padilla, the American Bar Association (“ABA”)’s standards required defense
attorneys to advise clients regarding deportation consequences.262 So, too, did
organizations of defense attorneys at the state and national level.263 Indeed, the
Uniform Collateral Consequences of Conviction Act—a result of collaboration
among a variety of stakeholders—even concluded that effective counsel included
effective advice regarding the civil consequences of conviction.264
A similar evolution is occurring regarding due process protections provided at
the plea stage. The Uniform Collateral Consequences of Conviction Act provides
for notice of potential civil consequences by a court at or before arraignment,
sentencing, and release.265 The ABA’s standards require a court to inform a
defendant when pleading guilty of potential civil consequences of the conviction.266 In addition, states have created rules of procedure requiring the court to
inform defendants of civil consequences of a plea.267 Similarly, the committee for
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure has supported the recommendation that
Rule 11 be amended to add to the plea colloquy an advisement regarding
immigration and sex offender consequences of a plea.268 In practice, many
prosecutors and judges include some civil consequences of a plea in the plea

(arguing that juries should be involved in pleas); Colin Miller, Anchors Away: Why the Anchoring Effect Suggests
that Judges Should Be Able to Participate in Plea Discussions, 48 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1293 (2010) (arguing that a
judicial role in plea discussions would increase fairness).
261. See Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1497.
262. See AM. BAR ASS’N, ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND DEFENSE
FUNCTION § 4-5.1(a), at 197 (3d ed. 1993); AM. BAR ASS’N, ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PLEAS OF
GUILTY § 14-3.2(f), at 116 (3d ed. 1999).
263. See NAT’L LEGAL AID & DEFENDER ASS’N, PERFORMANCE GUIDELINES FOR CRIMINAL DEFENSE REPRESENTATION § 6.2 (1995); Standards for Attorney Performance, in 2 COMPENDIUM OF STANDARDS FOR INDIGENT
DEFENSE SYSTEMS D10, H8, J8 (Neal Miller & Peter Ohlhausen eds., 2000) (surveying guidelines across multiple
jurisdictions).
264. See NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS, UNIFORM COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF
CONVICTION ACT (rev. ed. 2010), http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/archives/ulc/ucsada/2010final_amends.pdf.
265. See id. § 5–6.
266. See AM. BAR ASS’N, COLLATERAL SANCTIONS, supra note 41, § 19-2.3, at 2–3.
267. See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-14-109(b) (2011) (requiring a trial court accepting a guilty plea for
domestic violence to advise the defendant that he will never be able to buy a firearm and to only accept the plea if
defendant acknowledges this warning on the record); FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.172(c)(8) (requiring judges to inform
defendants of deportation consequences of guilty pleas); MASS. R. CRIM. P. 12(c)(3)(B) (requiring judge to inform
defendant of potential consequences when charge involves potential finding of sexual dangerousness); WYO. R.
CRIM. P. 11(b)(1) (requiring trial court to advise that guilty plea for drugs may result in loss of federal benefits).
268. See Minutes of the Judicial Conference Advisory Committee on Criminal Rules (Sept. 27–28, 2010).
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colloquy or plea negotiations.269 Although each of these rules and standards
simply provides the protection, but does not create a due process claim if the
protection is not provided,270 they nonetheless exhibit a parallel circumstance to
the one that motivated the decision in Padilla. Thus, as in the Sixth Amendment
context, the reality of plea bargains and the way courts apply due process
protections suggests that the direct-collateral distinction is neither useful nor
realistic.
There is a practicality to this conclusion: it does not make sense—from the
perspective of efficiency or fairness or likelihood of success—to place the entire
burden of the plea stage on counsel’s shoulders.271 As with many procedural
protections, a balance in the role of court and counsel seems the best way to ensure
fairness and access to justice.272 The court should not bear the burden of effective
counsel, including investigating and advising a client about the civil consequences
of a guilty plea. But counsel should not bear the burden of the court by having to
ensure that the defendant has notice of and thus voluntarily and intelligently
accepts what the court’s entry of a conviction imposes, including at least the most
significant and entangled civil consequences. If the plea stage is one to which we
afford protections, those protections should be consistent. And consistency suggests that Sixth Amendment and due process protections both consider the civil
consequences of convictions on their own terms. The significant entanglements
framework provides a useful framework to do so.
V. CONCLUSION: A GENERAL SIGNIFICANT ENTANGLEMENT INQUIRY EMERGES
The significant entanglement framework can guide consideration of which
constitutional rights apply at critical stages of the criminal process. Courts can ask:
is the consequence significant as an objective matter and to the particular
defendant, and is the consequence entangled with the criminal process? For a
critical stage, if the significant entanglement framework is met, then the protections afforded that stage apply to the civil consequence. By engaging in this
analysis, courts can grapple in a structured way with the protections that should be

269. Id.; FRANK ET AL., supra note 209; Ewald & Smith, supra note 4, at 152.
270. See, e.g., Steele v. Murphy, 365 F.3d 14, 19 n.2 (1st Cir. 2004) (noting the requirement of MASS. R. CRIM.
P. 12, but concluding that failure to follow the rule does not affect a federal constitutional claim); see also
Roberts, supra note 3, at 150 (noting that a state-established duty of the court to warn of civil consequences is not
a basis for finding a plea involuntary, or even if the plea is found involuntary, an admission during the plea
colloquy can be enough to impose a civil consequence).
271. Chin, Race, supra note 39, at 254 (“Basic fairness requires first that collateral consequences be collected
in one place, and second that persons charged with a crime be notified of what the consequences are when they
plead guilty or are sentenced.”).
272. See Roberts, supra note 3, at 150 (noting that even where states require judges to warn defendants of civil
consequences of a plea, it may be too late in the plea process to make any difference, and noting that Maine allows
a judge to adjourn a plea hearing after a defendant has been advised by the court of consequences, to allow for
consultation with counsel).
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afforded the civil consequences of criminal convictions, across stages of process
and across different rights.
This framework shares the reliance of Padilla and Turner on a fact-specific
analysis of the civil consequence and the stage of the criminal process. Thus, the
framework is based on the assumption that a fact-specific inquiry is appropriate
and helpful in determining the scope of rights, and made functional by applying the
significant entanglements framework. This is consistent with rights associated
with the criminal process generally and is in part due to the particular nature of
criminal law—with its inherent potential for serious deprivation of an individual’s
rights—which warrants close and individualized examination of its application.
This fact-specific basis for the significant entanglement framework means that,
beyond the threshold inquiry of the framework itself, the success of each
individual claim will be fact-dependent and thus highly variable.
Further, the significant entanglement framework suggests a substantial practical
impact on criminal defense and the criminal process. The Padilla decision, on its
own, raises serious practical questions about how defense counsel can fulfill her
constitutional obligations to her client. Some have suggested it is impractical to
meet this additional burden, while others have suggested that Padilla will lead to
improved collaborative representation.273 However, Padilla is the law of the land,
and the consequences that flow from it are unavoidable. In part, the significant
entanglement framework is an effort to lend coherence to civil consequences after
Padilla. The significant entanglement framework explicitly addresses a broader
range of consequences than Padilla, and the same arguments regarding the burden
on defense counsel apply. So, too, does the observation that mechanisms that
increase the ease with which defense counsel, and all actors in the process, obtain
information will undoubtedly mitigate this burden.274
There is also a potentially broader systemic impact of the significant entanglement framework. If this application of constitutional protections imposes practical

273. See, e.g., McGregor Smyth, From “Collateral” to “Integral”: The Seismic Evolution of Padilla v.
Kentucky and Its Impact on Penalties Beyond Deportation, 54 HOW. L.J. 795 (2011) (proposing frameworks for
defense attorneys to adequately advise clients in light of Padilla and focusing on the importance of holistic
defense); Derek Wikstrom, No Logical Stopping Point: The Consequences of Padilla v. Kentucky’s Inevitable
Expansion, 106 NW. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2012) (arguing that expansion of Padilla to consequences other than
immigration will overburden the defense system and thwart adequate representation); Ronald F. Wright, Padilla
and the Delivery of Integrated Criminal Defense, 58 UCLA L. REV. 1515 (2011) (discussing how Padilla is
indicative of and will contribute to a trend toward criminal defense where attorneys collaborate to address the
breadth of representation needs).
274. See James J. Bell & Kathleen E. Rudis, Advising Criminal Defendants in Indiana of Potential Collateral
Consequences of a Guilty Plea in the Aftermath of Padilla v. Kentucky, RES GESTAE, Apr. 2011, at 10,
http://www.kmlawyers.com/userfiles//collateral-consequences.pdf (including a “Padilla Advisory” chart for
defense counsel to use to ensure advice is given regarding thirty-one categories of consequences); Mario K.
Castillo, Immigration Consequences: A Primer for Texas Criminal Defense Attorneys in Light of Padilla v.
Kentucky, 63 BAYLOR L. REV. 587 (2011) (including a chart to be used as a tool for attorneys that tracks
immigration consequences in light of sentencing guidelines).
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burdens on defense counsel, prosecutors, and courts, these burdens may draw
additional attention to the system of civil consequences in the American legal
system.275 And this additional attention can create an opportunity to consider
whether the system we have created—historically, in a piecemeal way—is the one
we want to continue. At a minimum, the import of Padilla and Turner is that the
direct-collateral distinction is a flawed lens for evaluating the operation of civil
consequences of conviction in the reality of the modern criminal process. The
significant entanglement framework is a starting point for developing a more
coherent approach to that evaluation. This framework suggests a more just and
realistic doctrine for the protections afforded the civil consequences of criminal
convictions, and it may ultimately be a catalyst for redefining how our legal system
conceives of and applies the civil consequences of conviction.

275. See Daniel Kanstroom, Padilla v. Kentucky and the Evolving Right to Deportation Counsel: Watershed or
Work-in-Progress?, 45 NEW ENG. L. REV. 305 (2011) (discussing the tension that remains after Padilla with the
civil/criminal distinction in immigration law and suggesting that structural change is necessary to resolve the
incoherence resulting from this tension); Margaret Colgate Love, Evolving Standards of Reasonableness: The
ABA Standards and the Right to Counsel in Plea Negotiations, 39 FORDHAM URB. L.J. (forthcoming 2012)
(discussing how the ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: COLLATERAL SANCTIONS AND DISCRETIONARY
DISQUALIFICATION OF CONVICTED PERSONS can be a catalyst for changing the behavior of all actors in the plea
process and the systemic norms); Markowitz, supra note 123 (predicting that Padilla portends a shift in
immigration law because it rejects the concept of immigration law as purely civil and thus will be a “pivot point”
for the Court to treat deportation, and perhaps other areas, as quasi-criminal and develop protections accordingly).
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